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ABSTRACT
Modern computer systems are complex. Their complexity leads to secu-
rity vulnerabilities and software bugs that are hard to fix using existing
techniques. One current trend is that nowadays we have more redundant re-
sources available in computer systems. Redundant resources are independent
computing units that provide the same or similar functionalities. We have
redundant software instances such as standards compliant web browsers. We
also have lots of users that participate directly in computing.
In this dissertation, we study how to combine redundant resources to im-
prove software systems. Redundant software instances are implemented in-
dependently, they are unlikely to have the same security vulnerability. It is
hard to exploit all of them with the same attack. We first study improving
security using redundant software to detect anomaly behaviors.
In specific, we build Cocktail, which uses replicated execution of redundant
web browsers to improve browser security. Cocktail mirrors inputs to each
replica and votes on browser states and outputs to detect potential attacks,
while continuing to run. The net effect of Cocktail’s architecture is to shift
the security burden of the system from complex browsers to a simplified
layer of software. We demonstrate that Cocktail can withstand real-world
browser exploits and reliability issues, such as browser crashes, while adding
only 31.5% overhead to page load latency times on average, and remaining
compatible with popular web sites.
With Cocktail, we make use of the independent implementations of redun-
dant software. Next, we leverage users’ independent interactions with mobile
apps to build CrowdBlaze. CrowdBlaze recruits users through crowdsourcing
to help improve mobile app testing. CrowdBlaze combines human directed
interactive testing and automatic testing. CrowdBlaze constructs a model
of the app using static analysis and explore it first with automatic testing.
Users recruited through crowdsourcing help improve model coverage by pro-
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viding inputs that are too complex to generate during automatic testing.
By switching between the two testing mechanisms, CrowdBlaze achieve high
coverage effectively. We apply CrowdBlaze to cover reachable user interfaces
in Android apps. On average, CrowdBlaze is able to cover 66.6% more user
interfaces comparing to using automatic testing alone.
By designing and implementing Cocktail and CrowdBlaze, we show that
redundant resources are effective in improving nowadays software systems in
terms of security and testing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Modern computer systems are complex. To provide rich and powerful fea-
tures, they comprise millions of lines of code (LOC). For instance, the latest
version of Linux kernel and Chromium web browser have over ten million
and sixteen million LOC respectively.
Unfortunately, this level of complexity leads to security vulnerabilities and
software bugs that are hard to fix. For delivered software, industry experience
shows there are about one to twenty five errors per 1000 LOC [88] on average.
According to a Symantec report [30], there are over 4600 new vulnerabilities
detected each year between 2006 and 2011.
Security vulnerabilities and software bugs lead to intrusions and crashes
that cost millions of dollars [115, 21, 2] each year. Software bugs are respon-
sible for 40% of system failures [87]. A report by Gartner Group [107] shows
that an hour of downtime costs six million dollars on average for a financial
company. In 2011, for the over 200 new vulnerabilities [30] found in Firefox
and Safari, each of them may cost up to $120, 000 [29].
Currently there are different ways for defending against security vulner-
abilities and software bugs. They are effective in certain ways but not the
whole solution. Building formally verified systems [78, 76, 82] leverages lan-
guages and tools [62, 81, 50, 66] in design and implementation process, which
enable formal proof of correctness of the system. However, this approach calls
for huge efforts from the developers. For example, it took twenty man-year
to build seL4 [78] which comprises 8700 lines of C code and 600 lines of
assembler. For software with millions of LOC, the cost becomes prohibitive.
Finding bugs in existing code bases uses techniques in different areas such
as model checking [121], data mining [84], program analysis [117] and sym-
bolic execution [55]. Instead of proving correctness, these techniques offer
best effort approaches which don’t guarantee total defect elimination. They
may also suffer from issues such as language dependency, false positives and
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false negatives.
Runtime techniques to recover from failures [112, 71, 57, 99, 68] are useful
in improving software availability. However, it may be hard to diagnose and
find runtime errors in the first place, especially when byzantine fault [80]
happens.
One current trend is that we now have more redundant resources available
to us in the computer systems we use. We define redundant resources as
independent computing units that provide the same or similar functionali-
ties. Independent software systems that produce similar outputs on the same
inputs are one form of redundant resources. They usually support the same
or similar standards and protocols. For example, several mostly standards
compliant web browsers run the same web apps mostly the same way. Fire-
fox, Safari and Opera all support common standards and protocols. Web
apps written in HTML, CSS and JavaScript can be downloaded using HTTP
protocol and run on all these browsers. Apart from redundant software sys-
tems, we also have lots of users that participate in computing. Users can
solve problems such as Captchas and image tagging that are hard for com-
puters. Users can also provide valuable, intelligent reactions and feedbacks
in cases such as UI design and testing. For example, Google now does A/B
testing [15, 16] on real users to improve website design by measuring user’s
reactions to different design choices. By exploiting the power of large groups
of users, crowdsourcing [22] now becomes an important form of computing
service.
Redundant software systems are different from redundant users in their
strengths. Their differences make them complementary to each other in
terms of suitable use cases. Redundant software systems are more capable in
use cases that have large portions of automatable computations. Redundant
users are more suitable in use cases that require intensive interactions. When
combined together, they could improve computing tasks in different aspects
and achieve better results. For example, redundant software systems could
be used in software testing by replicating inputs to many software instances
at the same time in parallel. Redundant users may help to provide such
inputs where they are hard to generate automatically.
Inspired by the observations above, we would like to study how to use
redundant resources to improve current software systems.
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1.1 Dissertation and contributions
My dissertation is: existing redundant resources are effective at im-
proving software systems in aspects of security and testing.
We validated this claim through the design and implementation of Cocktail
and CrowdBlaze. Cocktail leverages three different existing web browsers to
build a new web browser which helps withstand browser bugs and security
vulnerabilities. CrowdBlaze builds a platform for users to help test mobile
apps online. Users can interact with a remote Android device by clicking
and typing through a web interface. Combined with automatic testing and
static analysis, we show that CrowdBlaze can achieve better testing coverage
comparing to using automatic testing alone.
Through building Cocktail and CrowdBlaze, we have learnt several prin-
ciples that are important in building systems with redundant resources.
1. Reuse redundant software systems as they were and avoid changes.
Adhering to this principle provides two key benefits. First, we can use
close-source software. In Cocktail, for example, we use Opera as one of
the replcias. Second, we can conveniently reuse updates of individual
software systems from their vendors.
2. Abstract common states for equivalence on necessary features. Software
systems are complex, it is infeasible to find perfect abstractions to
dictate their equivalence. We should instead focus on states that are
crucial for testing equivalence on features we care about. In Cocktail,
for example, we find a layer of abstraction that omits large amounts of
browser implementation details to test equivalence on security features.
3. Make users help with intelligent inputs and automate the whole system
as much as possible. Users are good at providing inputs to Captchas
and login screens that are hard for automated tools. However, users
are not as efficient when exploring large amount of simple inputs. For
example, users are not good at remembering combinations of inputs
to reproduce certain program state. In CrowdBlaze, we automatically
explore Android apps and switch to users only when we need intelligent
inputs to achieve better coverage.
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4. Provide users with meaningful guidance and prompt feedbacks. When
building CrowdBlaze, we find it is important to show users how their
interactions contribute to overall test coverage. We build Activity-
Intent-Graph (AIG) which illustrates the structure of an Android app
as a graph of Android activities and highlight the user’s test coverage
with different colors. One example of AIG is shown in Figure 3.5.
With the feedback of whether clicking a button leads to a new activity
in the graph, users can avoid repeating unnecessary actions and focus
on finding new activities to increase test coverage.
5. Make clear interfaces between software systems and users. Redundant
software systems and redundant users have different strengths. Within
one computing task, they are suitable for different cases. However,
they need each other’s results to make further progresses. Some of
these interfaces can be straightforward such as the browser display
in Cocktail. Users operate on browser display to provide inputs to
browser replicas and browsers show rendered web contents to users on
the display. Other interfaces may require more systematic design as
what we did in CrowdBlaze. In CrowdBlaze, users’ inputs are used
to drive the test forward. During this process, certain test states are
saved inside virtual machine snapshots. These snapshots are used as
interface between users and the automatic testing tool which loads these
snapshots to resume user’s test states and drive the testing further using
automatically generated test inputs. When automatic testing tool can
not generate meaningful inputs, it will save the snapshot again and
pass it to users who will help provide intelligent inputs.
Through our experiements, we show that both Cocktail and CrowdBlaze
are practical systems. Cocktail withstands real-world browser attacks while
adding only 31.5% overhead, and remaining compatible with popular web
sites. CrowdBlaze is able to cover 66.6% more user interfaces comparing to
using automatic testing alone. Overall, we are able to show that redundant
resources are effective at improving software systems in security and testing
aspects.
4
1.2 Dissertation overview
In Chapter 2, we describe the design and implementation of Cocktail. We
describe the motivation, threat model, overall architecture and design choices
of Cocktail.
In Chapter 3, we present CrowdBlaze. We describe how we combine in-
teractive user testing with other techniques, to achieve better testing results.
We described the design and implementation of the different components in
CrowdBlaze.
In Chapter 4, we describe the evaluation of both Cocktail and CrowdBlaze.
We show both systems are practical and achieved their design goals.
In Chapter 5, we describe necessary background knowledge for this thesis
and related works.
In Chapter 6, we list the future work and Chapter 7 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
USING REPLICATED EXECUTION FOR A
MORE SECURE AND RELIABLE WEB
BROWSER
2.1 Introduction
The near ubiquity of Internet access has put a wealth of information and
ever-increasing opportunities for social interaction at the fingertips of users.
Driving this revolution is the modern web browser, which has evolved from
a relatively simple client application designed to display static HTML data
into a complex networked operating system tasked with managing the myriad
of web-based applications people use daily. Support for dynamic content,
multimedia data, and extensibility has greatly enriched user’s experiences
at the cost of increasing the complexity of the browser itself. As a result,
current web browsers are plagued with security vulnerabilities, as evidenced
by Firefox, Safari, Google Chrome, Opera, and Internet Explorer reporting
374 new security vulnerabilities in 2009 and 500 in 2010 [31]. Unfortunately,
hackers actively exploit these vulnerabilities as indicated in reports from the
University of Washington [95], Microsoft [119], and Google [98, 97].
Both industry and academia have improved the security and reliability
of web browsers. Current commodity browsers make large strides towards
improving the security and reliability of plugins by using sandboxing tech-
niques to isolate plugins from the rest of the browser [122, 67]. However,
these browsers still scatter security logic throughout millions of lines of code,
leaving these systems susceptible to browser-based attacks. Current research
efforts, like Tahoma [65], the OP web browser [72], the Gazelle web browser
[116], and the Illinois Browser Operating System [114] all propose building
new web browsers to improve security. Although these browsers represent
a vast improvement in security over monolithic commodity browsers, they
require re-implementing large portions of the browser to withstand attacks.
Additionally, all of these browsers exhibit fail-stop behavior when encounter-
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ing a bug or attempted exploit, making them susceptible to browser crashes.
This chapter presents Cocktail, a system that uses replicated execution of
multiple existing web browsers to help withstand browser bugs and security
vulnerabilities. Cocktail runs three different off-the-shelf browsers, including
different plugins, in parallel with the assumption that any two of them are
unlikely to be vulnerable at the same time or exploited by the same malicious
page. Cocktail replicates user interaction and network requests in each of the
three browsers, then votes on network outputs and browser states to detect
any modifications resulting from browser bugs or web-based attacks. By
mirroring inputs to three different browsers and voting on outputs, Cocktail
shifts most of the browser’s security enforcement into a thin and simple soft-
ware layer, while reusing the mature, fast, and feature-rich implementation
of existing web browsers.
Replicated execution [51, 52, 64] is conceptually simple, but it is extremely
expensive to implement in practice for security purposes. To prevent replicas
from falling victim to the same attack, each replica must be a distinct imple-
mentation of the same specification, which requires significant development
resources. For example, N-version programming [61] usually requires three
times as many software developers. In contrast Cocktail takes advantage
of a form opportunistic N-version programming by using three off-the-shelf
browsers directly. In Cocktail’s case the specification is provided by web
standards bodies [36, 20, 4, 34, 19, 6], and the implementations are repre-
sented by three major web browsing systems: Firefox, Opera, and Google
Chrome.
Although modern web browsers respect common standards like HTML,
HTTP, CSS, JavaScript, and the Domain Object Model (DOM), most
browsers implement slight modifications to these standard web protocols.
These differences require Cocktail to abstract states and to cope with non-
determinism between the browsers in order to extract reliable features to vote
on for security. Designing these techniques is challenging because developers
did not build browsers with N-Version programming in mind.
Our experiments show that Cocktail is practical, prevents real attacks, and
withstands both reliability issues and injected faults. Cocktail’s replicas run
in parallel, so there is almost no performance loss. While more system re-
sources are required, multi-core systems continue to gain popularity, making
this style of security practical on modern computer systems.
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Our contributions are:
• Cocktail is the first system to show how to use multiple browsers as
a form of opportunistic N-Version programming for improved security
through replicated execution.
• We show how to abstract browser states and cope with non-determinism
to enable the use of existing browsers in Cocktail, despite differences
in their implementations.
• We demonstrate that Cocktail can withstand a wide range of real world
attacks with little overhead to the overall browsing experience.
2.2 A motivating example
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Figure 2.1: Results of the same exploit being served to four different
browsers.
On July 13 2009, researchers published a public proof-of-concept exploit for
Firefox 3.5 [11]. This exploit attacks a heap overflow vulnerability found in
the new JavaScript just-in-time compiler that Mozilla developers introduced
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in Firefox 3.5. With just a single visit to a malicious web page, the attacker
can run arbitrary instructions on the victim’s Windows XP computer. With a
few minor modifications, this exploit can also compromise the Firefox browser
on Linux and Mac OS X to execute arbitrary instructions on these platforms
as well [13, 12].
During our experiments, we ran this exploit on Firefox 3.5 and confirmed
the existence of the successful attack. However, when we opened this same
malicious page using Internet Explorer, Safari, Chrome, or Opera, these
browsers safely avoid the attack, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, because none
of these browsers had this same bug. Surprisingly, even older versions of
Firefox on Windows XP were unaffected by this attack. This difference in
processing the malicious payload motivates our architecture that uses three
different browsers to withstand attacks.
2.3 Problem statement, threat model, and assumptions
Cocktail focuses on providing protection for browsers and plugins by running
different browser implementations in parallel and detecting any inconsisten-
cies between these browsers. We use three distinct off-the-shelf browsers and
Flash player plugins.
We focus on attacks on browsers themselves where an attacker can com-
promise a browser vulnerability and control the browser.
In our threat model, we assume that an attacker has taken over a web site
and can serve arbitrary data to Cocktail. This data can come via a web site
that the user visits directly, or it can come indirectly through a web site that
serves off-site network resources, like ads. We assume that this malicious
data can result in a compromise to any of the browser replicas executing
within Cocktail, which implies that the attacker has the ability to execute
arbitrary instructions with the full privileges of the replica.
Currently, Cocktail does not provide any protection against bugs in web-
based applications. Fundamentally, bugs like cross-site scripting [70] and
cross-site request forgery [126] result from bugs in the server-side code. The
resulting attacks operate within current browser security policies, putting
them beyond the scope of Cocktail.
We trust the layers upon which Cocktail is built. This includes the net-
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work component and the visual voter in UI component, the libraries that the
output component uses, the Systrace tool we use to build browser sandbox-
ing, the underlying operating system, and the underlying hardware. If an
attacker can compromise any of these layers, they are likely to be able to
defeat Cocktail.
2.4 Design principles
Cocktail’s design is guided by the following three principles:
1. Use different existing browser implementations for diversity. We use
the high performance, feature rich, standards compliant – yet different –
implementations of existing browsers. This balance provides improved
security without sacrificing performance or functionality.
2. Avoid changing the replica’s implementation. Adhering to this principle
provides two key benefits. First, avoiding changing replicas enables
Cocktail to use closed-source browsers such as Opera. Second, avoiding
implementation specific details about the replicas enables Cocktail to
remain stable across updates of individual browsers.
3. Focus equivalence testing on security features. The browsers we use
are off-the-shelf products from different providers with millions of lines
of code in each of them. Though certain standards, such as HTTP
and HTML, are available, it is still hard to find perfect abstractions
to dictate their equivalence. However, if we focus on security features,
we can find a layer of abstraction that omits large amounts of browser-
implementation details while still preserving strong security guarantees.
In designing Cocktail the most significant issue we address is that of secu-
rity state selection. The decisions we make with respect to this impact both
the overall security improvements and architecture of Cocktail. In Cocktail
we strive to select state representations that are not too implementation spe-
cific, yet maintain potency in deterring real-world attacks. The fundamental
method we use in Cocktail to provide security is to require a majority vote
before any given state is permitted to persist in the browser. If a majority
is not obtained then the given action producing the invalid state is rejected.
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To see this more clearly take, for instance, the state abstraction of network
requests. If at least two of the three replicas attempt to fetch an image at
location foo.com/image.jpg, then Cocktail will fetch the resource and return
the data back to the requesting replicas. However, if none of the replicas re-
quest the same image then Cocktail will deny the request because it does not
reach consensus. By using network requests as a key state abstraction Cock-
tail effectively thwarts all attacks that require additional network resources
to succeed.
Conceptually, we view Cocktail as a black box with two channels of com-
munication in and out. One channel, the display, represents the agreed upon
visual output from the three replicas. The other channel, network requests,
represents the agreed upon network communications by the replicas. Given
our assumption that at most one replica is compromised, reaching consen-
sus on a network request implies that at least one uncompromised browser
made this individual network request, and reaching consensus on the display
implies that the browser, from the user’s perspective, produces output that
is equivalent to an uncompromised browser. Thus, the browser’s observable
behavior is consistent with that of an uncompromised browser. If Cocktail’s
behavior is consistent with an uncompromised browser, then it has effectively
thwarted the effects of potential attacks. In other words, if Cocktail looks
like an uncompromised browser, and it acts like an uncompromised browser,
then it is an uncompromised browser independent of what is inside of the
black box.
Cocktail’s state abstractions provide rigorous defenses against attacks, but
have the potential to incur false positives on non-malicious sites. The prob-
lem is that there are several valid reasons for a given browser state to deviate
from the other two replica states. For example, ad networks provide ran-
domized content to end users. This content represents a major class of non-
determinism that should not be considered an indicator of malice. Therefore,
one of our primary design considerations is to identify and eliminate sources
of non-determinism in each browser so that the requested resources are as
consistent, avoiding false positives. In Section 4.1.4 we show that our ap-
proach handles this and other forms of non-determinism while maintaining
compatibility with existing websites. Many of the design challenges faced by
Cocktail stem from this problem, and are discussed in Section 2.5.
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Figure 2.2: Cocktail overview.
2.5 Cocktail design challenges
Cocktail is comprised of a UI component, a replica component, and a net-
work component, as shown in Figure 2.2. The UI component is responsible
for providing the interface between the user and Cocktail, routing user input
to each replica, and voting on the display states of each replica. The replica
component maintains each browser replica, which all run in sandboxed en-
vironments. The network component is responsible for handling network
requests from the replicas and voting on network requests. We describe the
details of these components in Section 2.6.
The first challenge in Cocktail is defining appropriate state abstractions to
enable Cocktail to behave like an uncompromised browser even if an attacker
compromises one replica. This challenge is the basis for the security assur-
ances in Cocktail. The second and third challenges are to remove enough
sources of non-determinism from the server and in our browser replicas to
enable Cocktail to process web sites correctly. For these challenges Cocktail
does not need to remove all sources of non-determinism. Cocktail only has
to remove enough non-determinism so that Cocktail can reach a consensus
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for the states encountered on a wide range of web sites because of the natural
redundancy inherent in our system.
2.5.1 Challenge: Browser state abstraction
It is hard to abstract meaningful common states from different software.
Most works [59, 123, 79] from Byzantine Fault Tolerance community provide
state abstraction examples for replicas running the same software. Although
this type of replication does improve the reliability and availability of these
systems, they provide few security improvements because software exploits
manifest as correlated failures [106]. Other systems combine independent im-
plementations and rely on clear abstractions of states. For example, BASE
[104] combines different database implementations and considers the well-
defined database data to be the state of the system, and EnvyFS [48] com-
bines different file system implementations and considers the file system data
to be the state of the system. However, as distinct UI oriented software plat-
forms without table or inode-like natural state representations, abstracting
states for Firefox, Google Chrome, and Opera is hard.
The goal in defining browser states is to find states that are (1) meaningful
to users, (2) low-level enough to detect a wide range of attacks, and (3) high-
level enough to be uniform across different browser implementations.
2.5.2 Solution: Network and on-screen states
We define two states for all browsers: network and display states. Network
states include the HTTP requests and headers, and browser cookies that are
included in network requests. Browser cookies are a mechanism for HTTP
servers to store key-value pairs on client machines persistently. Browser
cookies are a first-class part of modern browsers and are generally consistent
across different browser implementations. Thus, including browser cookies
in our network state abstraction was an easy design decision.
Cocktail also uses the visual output of the browser as a state because
the it is the most meaningful state to users. The browser display can also
indicate severe security problems, especially when the attack requires user
interaction. For instance, in Sept. 2009, a vulnerability [14] found in Firefox
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3.0.x(x<14) pops up a dialog trying to coax users into installing a malicious
PKCS11 module. This vulnerability does not affect Safari, Google Chrome,
Opera or Internet Explorer and they showed no dialog box. This is a typical
example where a visual difference in one browser can indicate the existence
of an active security exploit.
Although web standards dictate how a browser should render and display
a web page, small implementation differences can cause visual discrepan-
cies. For example, browsers might use different font libraries, causing small
discrepancies in how the browser displays text. These discrepancies make it
difficult to do a pixel-by-pixel comparison of two browsers. Other researchers
have applied vision algorithms to web browsers to quantify visual similarity
[113], they use the SIFT algorithm [85] for comparing the rendering results
from the same browser for oﬄine analysis. However, the SIFT algorithm
takes tens of seconds to compare browser displays, making it unsuitable for
real-time analysis. The key attribute that makes SIFT attractive is that it
works on more coarse-grained visual information in an image, allowing SIFT
to match similar pages despite small differences in the rendering of the page.
In Cocktail we try to blend the high-level feature extraction properties of
SIFT with an algorithm that can run in real time. In our algorithm, we apply
Gaussian smoothing methods to mute small pixel differences in browsers and
we use Canny edge detection [58] to pull out higher-level features of each
replica’s display. These techniques are computationally efficient, allowing us
to take periodic snapshots of each replica’s display, and we can detect coarse-
grained changes to a page, like an attacker who overlays content on top of
a web page. However, our technique is unable to detect small changes to a
web page, like an attacker who changes a few words on an existing web page.
2.5.3 Challenge: Server-side non-determinism and side effects
Our second challenge is coping with server-side non-determinism and side
effects. Each time a browser makes an HTTP request, the server can return
different results. For example, each time one visits a news site the main page
will include any recently updated news stories. Furthermore, some HTTP
requests have side effects, like sending a friend a message on facebook. These
issues cause problems for Cocktail because we run three browsers in parallel,
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so we must ensure that each browser sees the same network data to create the
same browser states, and we must ensure that HTTP requests avoid inducing
unanticipated side effects and maintain current browser semantics.
Our goal for coping with server-side non-determinism and side effects is to
mask these effects from our browser safely and efficiently without modifying
the implementation of the browser replica.
2.5.4 Solution: Local web proxy
Our solution to this challenge is to implement a local web proxy that inter-
poses on all network connections made from our browsers. This local proxy
runs as a separate user-mode process and makes network requests on behalf
of the Cocktail replicas as shown in the network component in Figure 2.3. To
cope with server non-determinism, our local web proxy buffers the results of
HTTP requests in its cache component and uses this buffered data to ensure
that all replicas receive the same result for all requests. To avoid inducing
side effects on the server, the local web proxy makes only a single outgoing
HTTP request for all equivalent requests from the replicas.
To handle encrypted HTTPS traffic, we install our own self-signed certifi-
cate in each of our browser replicas to implement a man-in-the-middle proxy,
similar to the SSL-MITM proxy by Boneh, Inguava, and Baker [23]. The
HTTPS proxy establishes one encrypted connection with the web browser
and another encrypted connection with the requested HTTPS site while re-
laying clear text data in between the two encrypted channels. As a result,
the proxy is able to read the unencrypted web traffic and replicate it to all
of the browser replicas.
2.5.5 Challenge: Client-side non-determinism
Our third challenge is avoiding client-side non-determinism that can cause
our browsers to generate different abstract states for the same HTML and
JavaScript inputs. Based on our observations, browsers exhibit three types
of client-side non-determinism.
First, standard JavaScript functions may return non-deterministic or ran-
dom values. The two most common examples of these functions are
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Math.random() and Date.getTime(). In practice, web pages use these func-
tions to select random advertisements for a given content pane.
Second, some browsers include standard functions that return implemen-
tation specific results, and some browsers include non-standard JavaScript
interfaces to provide extended functionality. For example, the
navigator.userAgent property will disclose the identity of the browser and
the window.opera object exposes Opera-specific functionality not found on
other browsers. navigator.language also differs slightly between Opera and
Firefox. Browser locale setting differences make Opera indicate English as
“en” whereas Firefox and Chrome both indicate “en-US”. Similar differences
also exist for document.characterSet which has value “utf-8” on Opera
whereas “UTF-8” on Chrome.
Third, users interact with the browser via input devices, such as the
mouse and keyboard. These user interface actions induce computation in
the browser and can result in non-determinism if the system delivers UI
events to the incorrect UI widget or with varied timing.
Our two goals in coping with client-side non-determinism are to remove
enough sources of non-determinism to enable Cocktail to render a wide range
of web pages correctly, and to remove these sources of non-determinism with-
out modifying the implementation of the replicas or eliminating browser fea-
tures.
2.5.6 Solution: Browser extensions and configurations
Our primary mechanism for coping with client-side non-determinism is to
overwrite non-deterministic functions by injecting JavaScript into every page
via browser extensions. The goal is to eliminate non-determinism across each
replica. Browser extensions are a form of browser extensibility that gives
users the ability to extend and modify pages that they visit. One common
example of a browser extension is NoScript for removing JavaScript from
select web pages. Extensions are written in JavaScript and have access to a
wide range of states and events in the browser. We use extensions in each
of our replicas to inject JavaScript into all pages that we visit to overwrite
and normalize non-deterministic features of the browser. We implemented
extensions for each of our browser replicas as shown in the replica component
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in Figure 2.3.
One important property of our injected JavaScript is that we do not trust
this code – it serves solely as a mechanism for preventing false positives.
Injection by browser extensions works for random functions, such as
Math.random() and Date.getTime() as well as other functions provided
by the Date object. In order to make Date.getTime() deterministic we
discretize time and make the clock tick in three second intervals. In this
way each of the replicas generate the same return value for each call to
Date.getTime().
This overwriting technique also enables us to remove browser-specific at-
tributes whose existence indicate the exact browser, such as the window.opera
object, by replacing them with undefined objects. To normalize the
navigator.userAgent property we update configuration values for Chrome
and Opera to make them all appear as if they were Firefox. We also change
browser locale configurations to solve the navigator.language and
document.characterSet value differences among browsers. The net effect
of these modifications is that Cocktail has a reduce set of functionality as
compared to a conventional browser, but this subset is large enough in prac-
tice to handle current web pages correctly based on our experience in Section
4.1.4.
Researchers study user action tracking in areas such as collaborative brows-
ing [125, 102, 46, 86] with commercialized services [27] available. Recently
it also has been applied for security [77, 18, 37] and web testing purposes
[93, 28]. In Cocktail, we use similar techniques to record user interface
events, broadcast these events to all replicas, and replay these events cor-
rectly at each replica to induce the proper computation on each browser.
To accomplish this Cocktail must correctly identify the exact event that oc-
curred and the object or element it occurred upon. Then Cocktail translates
this event to the replica browsers for replication.
Although browsers adhere to most standards, there is room for some imple-
mentation specific interpretations of the standards, especially when dealing
with buggy HTML. Figure 2.4 shows an iframe used by flickr.com for an ad-
vertisement. Its source URL is missing the ending quote mark. Firefox and
Opera both automatically try to complete the quote and issue the HTTP
request whereas Chrome drops the request. Unfortunately, these types of
errors are difficult for Cocktail to compensate for and can prevent Cocktail
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from making legitimate network requests if all three replicas interpret the
data differently.
2.6 Cocktail implementation
In this section we describe each of the internal Cocktail components in detail.
Figure 2.3 provides more internal details for each component.
2.6.1 UI component
The UI component presents the user with a single browser window that
dynamically embeds one of the replica browser’s display. The input replicator
replicates the user’s inputs, such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, to all of the
replicas. For example, when the user loads facebook.com, all three browser
replicas load the Facebook homepage, but the display manager presents only
one of them to the user. After the user types in his or her user name and
password, he or she will login in all three browser replicas, clicking on a
picture causes all three replicas load the same picture, but the user only
sees one replica’s output. During these actions, the display voter executes
in the background, continually comparing the display of the three browsers
to detect suspicious display differences among the replicas. If a difference is
detected the display voter alerts the display manger, which will then thwart
the malicious browser.
In general, we speculatively select a single browser to serve as the display
replica, which we refer to as the control replica. If the control replica fails to
meet consensus then the display manager switches to another replica, thus,
enabling the user to continue browsing. We use XEmbed and Qt widgets
to implement our display manager and ImageMagick libraries to capture
browser display for the display voter. We use OpenCV library to implement
image processing in display voter. More details are given in Section 2.8.
2.6.2 Replica component
The replica component maintains the three distinct browsers, executing each
one inside an OS-level Systrace sandbox [96] that provides an extra layer of
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isolation between each browser replica and the rest of the system. OS-level
sandboxes prevent replicas from communicating with each other and from
accessing unauthorized system resources. Although OS-level sandboxes can
help limit the effects of an attack, they operate on OS-level abstractions, such
as files and sockets, which are too low level to enforce browser-level security
policies that operate on high-level browser abstractions, like cookies and
HTTP requests. In Cocktail, the main benefits of our OS-level sandboxing
are to force the replicas to use the Cocktail system and to limit access to
sensitive OS states.
We also apply replication to browser plugins. For Flash, we use Swfdec for
Firefox, Gnash for Opera, and the Adobe Flash Player for Chrome, giving
us diversity both for the browser itself and for Flash plugins.
2.6.3 Network component
The network component’s primary responsibility is to verify network re-
quests. The network component accomplishes this task by interposing on
network requests to enforce a majority vote for each resource requested by
the replicas. The network manager is comprised of a request queue, request
voter, URL fetcher, and cache. As Figure 2.3 shows, the request queue re-
ceives all network requests from the replicas. These requests are then voted
upon by the request voter. If a 2
3
majority vote is obtained for a given re-
source then it is considered validated and a single copy of this resource is
obtained by the URL fetcher. The URL fetcher stores the resource in the
cache and serves it to each replica that requested the resource. The cache
is necessary due to performance and correctness considerations. Instead of
having a timeout period for each request, Cocktail immediately fetches an
URL once two requests have been made for a given resource – indicating a
majority vote. This means that the third replica may still request the re-
source, at which time the URL fetcher will serve the page from the cache.
The network component is implemented with 4704 lines of Java code.
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2.7 Discussion
This section discusses the ramifications of some of the design decisions that
we make in Cocktail.
One potential disadvantage of making all of the replicas appear to be the
same browser is that Cocktail has only the functionality found in all of our
replicas. Fortunately, most pages we tested work correctly in Cocktail, in-
dicating that the least common subset of our three replicas is sufficient for
today’s popular pages. Even more advanced features, like browser extensi-
bility, are still supported in Cocktail. All of our browsers support extensions
and the extensions we tested that work in Chrome and Opera also work as
Firefox Greasemonkey scripts. Unfortunately, the Firefox extension API is
more extensive than the extension API for Chrome and Opera and some
Firefox extensions will not work in Cocktail.
One problem with N-Version or Byzantine Fault Tolerant systems is that
attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in two or more replicas causing the at-
tack to behave like a correlated failure. Although browsers do tend to contain
many security vulnerabilities, browser vendors tend to patch these vulner-
abilities quickly, narrowing the window for this type of correlated attack.
According to a recent report from Symantec [31], in 2009 the average win-
dow of exposure for a vulnerability is less than one day for Firefox and Opera,
one day for Internet Explorer, two days for Chrome, and 13 days for Safari.
In 2010 the average window of exposure is less than one day for Safari and
Chrome, one day for Opera, two days for Firefox and four days for Internet
Explorer. Keeping the Cocktail replicas up-to-date is paramount to avoiding
this type of attack.
2.8 Voting
In general, our voting mechanism has two main tasks: validate outgoing
network requests and check visual states. For network requests, Cocktail
checks for equivalence among all of the replica’s HTTP requests. HTTP
requests contain HTTP header information, cookies, the payload, and the
URL of the request. HTTP headers contain information about the client,
such as types of content the browser is willing to accept, cache controls,
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and the user-agent to let servers know what type of browser is making the
request. The only items we check in the header are items that we perceive to
be security critical: HTTP authorization credentials and the referrer string to
signify the page that originated the request. Our algorithm ignores all other
items in the header because they tend to depend heavily on the browser and
because they have little bearing on the security properties of the network
request.
In addition to checking authorization credentials and referrer strings, our
algorithm also checks equivalence for cookies, for the full payload of the
request, and for URLs. Any differences in cookies or payloads will cause the
voting algorithm to consider two network requests as being different. For
URLs, our algorithm does a complete check for equivalence except for query
strings. Cocktail compares URL query strings using a case-insensitive string
matching function to compensate for some of the implementation specific
capitalization that we observe.
When designing our visual state comparison algorithm, we try to balance
the desire for capturing detailed visual information from each replica with
potential false positives due to small implementation differences. Plus, our
algorithm has to be fast enough to run in real-time.
In the display voter, our display capture and image processing methods
reveal the structure of the page by extracting the position information of
its rectangular components. To identify rectangular components, we apply
a Gaussian smoothing filter to blur the image. Then, we use a Canny edge
detector to extract horizontal and vertical edges from the blurred image to
identify rectangular structures in the display. The display voting algorithm
examines the number, size, and relative position of these rectangles. For
instance, if there is a big rectangle in the center of only one browser suggests
there could be a dialog window displayed in only one browser. In addition
to rectangle detection, our algorithm also checks pixel color information by
running the image through a filter to mute any small color differences that
may occur naturally in different browsers.
By checking these high-level features, we can detect large changes to the
web page, like an attacker causing a popup dialog box to cover part of a web
page, or an attacker making large changes to the content of a compromised
replica. Also, the particular algorithms we use have efficient implementa-
tions available from the OpenCV library, and our visual state comparison
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algorithm adds effectively no overhead to our system.
For visual states, checking can be expensive, so currently Cocktail scans
each of the replicas every 1.5 seconds to check for equivalence among the
three replicas. If Cocktail detects a divergent replica, it shows the user a
display from one of the replicas in agreement.
Because Cocktail replicates inputs for browser replicas, three browser repli-
cas are enough to tolerate one faulty browser. This simplification is possible
because the order of operations on each replica does not rely on distributed
decision-making process, which requires 3f + 1 replicas to tolerate f faulty
ones.
2.9 Limitations
In previous sections we show that Cocktail can withstand several real-world
attacks, and we argue that it will help prevent a wide range of browser-based
attacks. In this section we discuss ways an attacker can avoid detection and
carry out attacks on Cocktail.
An attacker can evade Cocktail by exploiting a vulnerability in a shared
system service, a shared library, or by exploiting vulnerabilities in two or
more replicas. Although Cocktail uses different browsers for replicas, these
browsers share the underlying operating system and link to some of the
same libraries, like libc. Exploiting a bug in the OS or a library used by all
replicas will likely have similar effects in all of the replicas and Cocktail would
be unable to detect this type of attack. In addition to shared resources, and
attacker could evade Cocktail by exploiting two separate bugs in different
replicas to cause them to do perform the same state transitions and produce
the same outputs. Fortunately browsers tend to patch vulnerabilities quickly
[31].
Cocktail abstracts some implementation specific details to compare visual
states for our replicas and to account for some implementation-specific ar-
tifacts in network requests. Because of these abstractions, the attacker has
some room to modify states in a meaningful way that Cocktail will still con-
sider equivalent. For example, an attacker could change a few key words on
a web page to hide malicious activities, and the Cocktail visual detection
algorithm will still likely consider these two displays to be equivalent. How-
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ever, this limitation does still place significant restrictions on attackers by
preventing them from making large visual changes to a web page.
Finally, Cocktail does not include HTML5 storage and file system states
as part of its voting algorithm. HTML5 storage is a browser mechanism that
enables JavaScript code to store persistent state in the browser. Omitting
checks on HTML5 storage does not affect Cocktail adversely because these
states are contained within the browser and ultimately will affect the network
or display states to have an effect on the browser, thus Cocktail will still
prevent damage that can be done from attackers accessing HTML5 storage.
However, file system state changes from the browser can affect the rest of the
state on the system. Fortunately our sandboxing system prevents replicas
from accessing many sensitive states on the system, like binaries and libraries.
However, there are still some files that the replicas can access, leaving the
opportunity for attacks to cause damage. This limitation is not fundamental
and a result of our current implementation – we plan to add checks for file
system modifications in future work.
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Figure 2.3: Cocktail architecture.
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<iframe src="
http://www.adfusion.com/Adfusion.PartnerSite/ca
tegoryhtml.aspx?userfeedguid=948fbed8-69ae-4659
-b3c1-b9863e5ab24e&clicktag=http://ads.bluelith
ium.com/clk?2,13%3B738a290b44284f0c%3B12c3705b5
e2,0%3B%3B%3B1410192806,5jBaAEmJEgC.5m.........
...AAAAAA=,http%3A%2F%2Fglobal.ard.yahoo.com...
........0%2F%2A%24,http%3A%2F%2Fadjax.flickr.ya
hoo.com%2Fads%2F792600119%2Flrec%2F,&CB={REQUES
TID}
*****URL missing " here*****
width="300" height="250" scrolling="no"
frameborder="0" marginheight="0"
marginwidth="0"></iframe>
Figure 2.4: iframe source URL not quote-closed
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CHAPTER 3
USING CROWDSOURCING TO IMPROVE
MOBILE APP TESTING1
3.1 Introduction
Mobile apps are growing fast. Today there are over 500, 000 apps available for
Android and 650, 000 apps for Apple iOS devices [24]. Total app downloads
have reached 15 billion and 30 billion for the two platforms respectively [24].
International Data Corporation (IDC) predicts that by 2015 total app down-
loads will reach 182.7 billion [17].
Since installing and deleting apps become as easy as finger taps and slides,
customers may easily switch among similar apps to try out and find their
preferable ones. Up to 1st Aug 2012, there are 14, 138 “News and Magazines”
apps on Google Play, only 4% of them get downloaded over 50, 000 times [3].
To win customers, it is vital for the developers to release fast and to ensure
their apps work as designed. Facebook app, for example, is announcing a
4−8 week release timeline [32]. To do so, developers need an efficient testing
strategy to produce high quality software.
With the recent technical progresses [44], automatic testing becomes an ef-
ficient and affordable choice for mobile app developers. However, mobile apps
typically involve heavy user interactions which require human knowledge or
intelligence to generate valid test input. For example, guessing Captchas [40],
filling log-in forms, and playing games are hard to handle for existing auto-
matic testing approaches. Some other common app features such as search-
ing the web/local contents and choosing files to upload can be tested much
more efficiently with the meaningful keywords and paths provides by human
testers. Furthermore, failing to handle a small number of the above interac-
tions may result in a significant loss in test coverage, because the test driver
1The work described in this chapter was done when Hui Xue was visiting University
of California, Berkeley.
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can never reach the program states beyond those interactions. Therefore,
properly involving human efforts into automatic testing process should be
a desirable and practical way to achieve efficient, cheap, and high-coverage
mobile-app testing.
Considering that the majority of app developers are small teams or per-
sonal developers, it is often too expensive for them to hire professional human
testers or testing companies. Crowdsourcing based testing [73], as a emerging
cloud computing technique, provides a cheaper way to acquire human-testing
efforts for these developers. Crowdsourcing based testing enables developers
to gather a large group of people with broad diversity in a short time, and
it saves the cost in hiring and managing testers.
In this chapter, we propose CrowdBlaze, a system that combines human-
testing efforts from crowdsourcing and automatic testing tools to provide
efficient, cheap, and high coverage testing for Android apps. The basic idea
behind the system is to first automatically explore an app using automatic
testing tool, and switch to human testers when the automatical testing tool
can’t explore any further. After the human testers help to go through the
complex interaction, the running app is fed back to the automatic testing tool
to explore further. In CrowdBlaze, the automatic testing tools and human
testers are doing the things they are good at, respectively.
3.1.1 Background on android
Android is a computing platform for mobile devices. It includes an operating
system based on Linux, middleware, and a set of core applications. Applica-
tions are typically written in Java but may include native code. Applications
compile into a custom Dalvik executable format (.dex), which is executed by
the Dalvik virtual machine.
The building blocks of Android applications are components. The An-
droid sdk defines four components, implemented as subclasses of Activity,
Service, ContentProvider, and BroadcastReceiver. An activity is a user-oriented
task (such as a user interface), a service runs in the background, a content
provider encapsulates data, and a broadcast receiver responds to broadcasts
from the Android system. Components interact using typed inter-process
communication by exchanging intents. Inter-application communication also
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uses intents.
Android applications are event driven. This means that execution is trig-
gered by events generated by the user or the system. When an event is gener-
ated, the Android runtime invokes application code called an event handler.
Examples of events include taps, swipes, SMS notifications, and timer events
among many others.
3.1.2 Terminology
We now clarify the intended meaning of terms we use. We say static analy-
sis for procedures that derive information about programs without executing
them. Dynamic analysis refers to automatic analyses that execute programs.
Automatic testing is one kind of dynamic analysis. We use interactive analy-
sis for user-guided exploration. A runtime analysis is dynamic or interactive
and a program analysis is includes all the above.
3.1.3 Combining interactive analysis and dynamic analysis
with the help of static analysis
Smartphone software combines several features that confound automated
analysis techniques. Routine use of reflection, and interaction with the
network, databases and other devices limits the efficacy of static analysis.
Dependency on gestures, textual input that is semantically validated, such
as phrases describing geographical locations, or musical genres, and audio-
visual input make dynamic analysis difficult. Though applications can be
tested manually, users lack a clear overview of an application’s structure, so
completely manual analysis is slow and undirected.
The information computed by different analysis approaches is visualised
in the figure shown in Figure 3.1. A cloud represents all executions. Static
analysis techniques solve a model construction problem by deriving an ap-
proximate representation of application behavior. The approximation, visu-
alised by the shaded grid, represents behavior that possibly occurs. When
resolving method calls with dynamically determined targets, a sound static
analysis would have to make the imprecise assumption that arbitrary code
can be executed. Such imprecisions snowball so static analyzers make un-
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static analysis dynamic analysis
interactive analysis sa¨ıda
Figure 3.1: Comparison of different analysis techniques.
sound assumptions in practice. The results of such analysis contain both
false positives and false negatives.
The information computed by dynamic analysis is depicted by an ellipse.
Dynamic analyses compute behavior that necessarily occurs, meaning that
every trace computed is feasible. Dynamic analysis results contain false neg-
atives, because all executions are not covered, but do not contain false pos-
itives. To avoid enumerating uninteresting behavior, testing tools solve a
coverage problem by finding executions that exercise regions in a model of
an application. The model usually has to be provided by the analyst.
Interactive analysis, such as manual testing, is depicted by circles. Inter-
active analysis can discover behavior driven by complex inputs, but is slow
and undirected.
We introduce the model construction and coverage problem (mccp), which
is to construct a model of a program and to find executions that cover paths of
a fixed length in the model. mccp combines the goals of model construction
and coverage oriented techniques. Our goal is to develop a solution to mccp
that combines the strengths of model construction and coverage techniques.
Statically aided dynamic analysis
The insight driving our work is that information computed by static, dynamic
and interactive approaches can iteratively improve each other. A statically
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constructed model can guide dynamic analysis to improve coverage. A visu-
alisation of a model can guide a user down unexplored program paths that
require user input. The results of runtime analysis improve model construc-
tion by providing information about targets of statically unresolved method
calls.
We present Statically Aided Interactive Dynamic Analysis (sa¨ıda), a so-
lution to mccp that simultaneously constructs and covers a model of a pro-
gram. sa¨ıda manipulates a pair consisting of a program model and a set of
executions. We use static analysis to construct the model. We run a dynamic
analysis to cover the model with executions and improve the model. In cases
where dynamic analysis is stuck, we request assistance from the user. The
three analyses above run in parallel and communicate by message passing.
There exist several proposals for combining the ideas above. The novel
feature of sa¨ıda is that we automatically alternate between dynamic, inter-
active, and static analysis, and that information from each analysis drives
the other. Graphically speaking, sa¨ıda finds a grid that includes all observed
program executions, and simultaneously derives an execution inhabiting each
square in the grid. sa¨ıda computes information about possible and necessary
(alternatively, may and must) program executions.
Android applications as a challenging problem
Android applications exhibit all the complex programming and interactive
features mentioned earlier and are an apposite challenge problem for sa¨ıda.
Graphical interfaces are implemented using a programming abstraction from
the Android SDK called an activity. Activities interact with each other by
sending structured messages called intents. We introduce a model of Android
applications called the Activity Intent Graph (aig). Paths in the aig abstract
how an application’s display evolves. We apply sa¨ıda to solve mccp for
aigs. In the evaluation section, we show that there are activities discovered
by sa¨ıda that are not discovered if static, dynamic and interactive analysis
are not combined.
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3.1.4 Contributions and Organisation
We introduce a new problem, present a novel, general solution for the prob-
lem, and evaluate our solution on popular applications. Our contributions
are as follows.
1. Our conceptual contribution is the model construction and coverage
problem (mccp), which is to simultaneously construct and cover a
model of a program. We study activity coverage, an instance of mccp
for exploring the user interfaces in an application.
2. Our algorithmic contribution is Statically Aided Interactive Dynamic
Analysis (sa¨ıda), a new technique that solves the model coverage prob-
lem by combining the strengths of static, dynamic and interactive anal-
ysis. Our work is the first to combine all three techniques in a goal-
directed, automatic feedback loop.
3. We contribute Crowdblaze, a system which orchestrates a static an-
alyzer, dynamic analyzer, and an interactive analyzer to model and
cover an application. We run all processes in parallel and crowd source
the interactive analysis for efficiency.
3.2 The model construction and coverage problem
We introduce the model construction and coverage problem (mccp), which is
to construct a model of a program and to exhibit executions that maximise
coverage of the model with respect to a metric.
3.2.1 Models and coverage
The set of executions of a program defines a state transition graph. A model
of a program is an approximation of this graph. We formalise approximation
using abstract interpretation [63]. Unlike standard applications of abstract
interpretation, we do not assume that models are overapproximations.
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States and traces
A state consists of all possible information about a program, including the
value of the program counter, and the contents of the stack and heap. Let
State be the set of states and P(State) be the set of all subsets of states.
A transition is a pair of states representing a state change. Let Trans be
the set of valid transitions. A trace τ = τ0, τ1, τ2, . . . is a sequence of states.
An execution is a trace in which every pair is in the transition relation. Let
Trace be the set of all traces and Exec be the set of program executions.
Models
We consider abstraction of states and of traces. A state abstraction consists
of a set of abstract states aState and a state concretisation function sconc.
(aState, sconc) sconc : aState → P(State)
The function sconc satisfies that every state s is in the concretisation sconc(a)
of some abtract state a. A trace abstraction consists of a set of abstract traces
aTrace and a trace concretisation function tconc.
(aTrace, tconc) tconc : aTrace → P(Trace)
The function tconc satisfies that every trace τ is in the concretisation sconc(pi)
of some abtract trace pi.
We consider graph-based models of program behavior. Call graphs, control-
and data-flow graphs, and predicate abstractions constructed by model check-
ers, are all models in the sense we consider. A program model is a tuple
G = (V,E , Init , vlabel , elabel)
consisting of a set of vertices V , a set of edges E, a set of initial vertices
Init , a function vlabel : V → aState that labels vertices with abstract states,
and a function elabel : E → aTrace that labels edges with abstract traces.
A path pi = pi0, pi1, . . . in the graph is a sequence of vertices that starts from
an initial vertex and respects the edge relation. We denote the set of paths
in G as paths(G).
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We show how a model approximates program behavior. We abbreviate
sconc(vlabel(v)) to sconc(v) and tconc(elabel(v, w)) to tconc(v, w). The set
of traces represented by a path is given by the function conc : paths(G) →
P(Trace), which is defined inductively below.
conc(pi) =ˆ

{τ ∈ Trace} if pi = pi0, where τ contains
some s in sconc(pi0)
{ττ ′ ∈ Trace} otherwise, where τ0 is in
sconc(pi0), τ ∈ tconc(pi0, pi1),
and τ ′ ∈ conc(pi1, pi2, . . .)
The concretisation conc(Q) of a set of paths Q contains the concretisation
of every path in Q. A model G is an overapproximation of a program P if
the set of program executions is a subset of conc(paths(G)).
Coverage
Coverage relates executions and paths in a model. An execution τ covers a
path pi if τ is in conc(pi). Conversely, we say pi is covered by τ. A set of
executions T covers pi if some execution in T covers pi. A set of executions
T covers a set of paths P if T covers every path in P .
Coverage is typically measured with a metric. Let paths(G, k) be the set
of paths of length k in a graph G, and cover(G, T, k) be the set of paths of
length k covered by T . Note that cover(G, T, k) and paths(G, k) are finite
sets. The coverage metric we use, parameterised by a bound k is given below.
metric(G, T, k) =
|cover(G, T, k)|
|paths(G, k)| =
Covered Paths
Possible Paths
In the next section, we describe an algorithm to simultaneously construct G
and T .
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The model construction and coverage problem (mccp) for a program
P and length k is to derive a model G and set of executions T such
that
1. G overapproximates P , and
2. T covers paths of length k in G.
In the rest of the section, we introduce an instance of mccp that is useful
for analysis of Android applications.
3.2.2 Activity intent graph and activity coverage
An Activity Intent Graph (aig) consists of vertices labelled with activity
names and a special non-activity vertex representing components that are
not activities. Edges in an aig are labelled with intents. In illustrations,
we do not represent the non-activity vertex to reduce clutter. An activity
vertex is an abstraction of all states in which that activity is running and
the non-activity vertex is an abstraction of all states in which a non-activity
component is running. An edge between two activities labelled with an intent
is an abstraction of all executions that start in the first activity and lead to
the second by sending the intent.
The activity coverage or aig coverage problem is to construct an aig that
overapproximates an application’s behavior and generate executions that
visit every activity. A statically constructed aig may not be an overapprox-
imation because the target of an intent cannot always be resolved statically,
and because some intents are sent by the system.
Since user interfaces are implemented with activities, activity coverage can
be viewed as a measure of how many user interfaces have been explored. A
similar problem is addressed in model-based gui testing [91]. Our work was
done concurrently and independently of [45, 43] (yet to appear), who claim
to be the first to use static analysis to construct models for gui testing.
Example 1 Figure 3.2 illustrates the aig for SyncMyPix. This graph was
generated automatically by our static analysis. Each vertex represents an ac-
tivity. The dashed edge from MainActivity to SyncProgressActivity indicates that
static analysis can detect and resolve an intent sent between these activities.
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Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.SyncProgressActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.MainActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.SyncResultsActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.SettingsActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.DonateActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.graphics.CropImage)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.*.FacebookLoginWebView)
Statically resolved intent Dynamically resolved intent
Figure 3.2: An Activity Intent Graph for SyncMyPix. The vertices
represent activities and edges represent intents sent between activities.
Dotted edges represent edges that were computed statically. The intent
sent to launch the activity for donating money and for the Facebook login
were identified by the dynamic analysis.
35
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.SyncProgressActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.MainActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.SyncResultsActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.SettingsActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.DonateActivity)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.graphics.CropImage)
Activity(com.nloko.android.
syncmypix.*.FacebookLoginWebView)
Statically resolved intent Dynamically resolved intent
Fig. 1. An Activity Intent Graph for SyncMyPix. The vertices represent
activities and edges represent intents sent between activities. Dotted edges
represent edges that were computed statically. The intent sent to launch the
activity for donating money and for the Facebook login were identified by
the dynamic analysis.
two activities labelled with an intent is an abstraction of all
executions that start in the first activity and lead to the second
by sending the intent.
The AIG coverage problem for length 0, which we call
activity coverage, is to construct an AIG that overapproximates
an application’s behaviour and generate executions that visit
every activity. A statically constructed AIG may not be an
overapproximation because the target of an intent cannot
always be resolved statically, and because some intents are
sent by the system.
User interfaces for applications are implemented using
activities. The activity coverage problem can be viewed as
asking for all user interfaces in an application to be explored. A
similar problem is addressed in model-based GUI testing [18].
also solves is to cover every edge in an EFG, which amounts
to firing every event handler at least once. The first application
of static analysis to construct models for GUI testing is yet to
appear in print [4], [3].
Example 2: Figure 9 illustrates the AIG for SyncMyPix.
This graph was generated automatically by our static analysis.
Each vertex represents an activity. [Vijay : finish this] For
example, the activity The edge from first to second shows that
static analysis can detect an execution that leads from the main
activity to the activity for modifying preferences. The edge is
not detected by static analysis because [Vijay : ]
C. Event Flow Graph Coverage
An Event Flow Graph (EFG) represents temporal depen-
dencies between firing of event handlers as well as how event
handlers enable and disable each other. EFGs have been used
in model-based testing of GUIs [18]. The EFG for an Android
application consists of vertices labelled by components and
edges labelled with event handlers.
A vertex in an EFG represents all states in which a compo-
nent is running. Unlike a AIG, an edge in an EFG is labelled
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Fig. 2. Schematic overview of SAI¨DA. Static analysis generates a model G.
Runtime analysis generates a set of executions T to cover G. The runtime
analysis consists of an automatic analysis, which generates certain events and
an interactive analysis driven by the user, which generates all other events.
with an event handler represents all possible executions in
which that event handler fires. AIGs and EFGs have the same
sets of vertices, but edges in an EFG represent more precise
information than those in an AIG. The EFG coverage problem
we study is to cover every edge in an EFG, which amounts to
firing every event handler at least once.
IV. STATICALLY AIDED INTERACTIVE DYNAMIC
ANALYSIS
We present Statically Aided Interactive Dynamic Analysis
(SAI¨DA), a new technique for exploring program behaviour,
and a system that implements this technique. This section de-
scribes SAI¨DA and Section V provides implementation details.
Overview of SAI¨DA
A schematic overview of SAI¨DA is shown in Figure 2.
SAI¨DA allows for a static analyzer, a dynamic analysis, and
an interactive testing tool to interact provided a few interface
functions are implemented. We take as input an application P ,
and a bound k, and produce as output a pair (G, T ), consisting
of a model G and a set of traces T . We calculate the coverage
metric metric(G, T, k) from G and T .
We begin analysis by using static analysis to construct
a model G. The model may not overapproximate program
behaviour for reasons identified earlier. The graph is used by
runtime analysis to generate executions, in an attempt to max-
imise coverage. If runtime analysis discovers an execution not
represented by G, information about the execution is conveyed
to the static analyzer. The static analyzer uses this information
to improve the model. Our analysis alternates between model
construction and model coverage until the runtime analysis
achieves full coverage or the measured coverage stabilises.
We describe the algorithmic details of SAI¨DA next.
The main data structure
All information about the analysis is stored in a data
structure shown below.
(P,G,trail, ⌧, T,explored)
dynamic
analysis
interactive
analysis
not automatable
automatable
static analysis
Model G Model T
Graph G
Trace T
Figure 3.3: Schematic overview of sa¨ıda. Static analysis generates a model
G. Runtime analysis generates a set of executions T to cover G. The
runtime analysis consists of an automatic analysis, which generates certain
events and an interactive analysis driven by the user, which generates all
other events.
The edge from MainActivity to FacebookLoginWebView and to DonateActivity is not
detected by the first iteration of static analysis and is added by sa¨ıda.
3.3 Statically aided interactive dynamic analysis
We present Statically Aided Interactive Dynamic Analysis (sa¨ıda), a new
technique for exploring program behavior, and a system that implements this
technique. This section describes sa¨ıda and Section 3.4 provides implemen-
tation details.
Overview of sa¨ıda
A schematic overview of sa¨ıda is shown in Figure 3.3. sa¨ıda allows for a
static analyzer, a dynamic analysis, and an interactive testing tool to inter-
act provided a few interface functions are implemented. We take as input
an application P , and a bound k, and produce as output a pair (G, T ), con-
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function description
current (τ) Return the last vertex of a path pi whose con-
cretisation contains τ
extend (τ,pi) Return an execution τ ′ that extends τ and tra-
verses pi
automatable (τ,pi) Return true if τ can be extended automatically
to traverse pi
covered (G, T, k) Return true if every path of length k in G is
covered by T
stuck (G, T, k) Return true if the analysis has not made
progress
Table 3.1: Interface functions required for sa¨ıda
sisting of a model G and a set of traces T . We calculate the coverage metric
metric(G, T, k) from G and T .
We begin analysis by using static analysis to construct a model G. The
model may not overapproximate program behavior for reasons identified ear-
lier. The graph is used by runtime analysis to generate executions, in an
attempt to maximise coverage. If runtime analysis discovers an execution
not represented by G, information about the execution is conveyed to the
static analyzer. The static analyzer uses this information to improve the
model. Our analysis alternates between model construction and model cover-
age until the runtime analysis achieves full coverage or the measured coverage
stabilises. We describe the algorithmic details of sa¨ıda next.
The main data structure
All information about the analysis is stored in a data structure shown below.
S = (P,G, trail, τ, T, explored)
It consists of the application under test (aut) P , a model G, a stack trail
containing paths of length k from G, called a trail, the current execution τ, a
set of previously generated executions T , and a map explored : paths(G, k)→
{true, false} that records which paths have been explored. The term trail is
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standard in backtracking-based search algorithms.
Elements of the data structure are manipulated by the functions in Ta-
ble 3.1. The query current is used to guide the search process, automatable
is used to switch between dynamic and interactive analysis, and covered and
stuck constitute the stopping criterion. The only function that manipulates
the current execution is extend. The trail is manipulated using the standard
functions top, pop and push.
sa¨ıda uses three procedures that execute in parallel and communicate by
message passing as shown in Algorithm 1. We describe each procedure next.
Model construction with static analysis
We construct models using the static analysis procedure Statically-Analyse,
which takes as input an application P , graph G and set of executions T . If T
and G are the empty set and empty graph, we obtain the result of standard
static analysis. If T and G are non-empty, the model generated will contain
G and is covered by T .
Automatic model exploration with dynamic analysis
We cover a model with executions using dynamic analysis. The algorithmic
content of dynamic analysis is summarised by Auto-Explore, a backtracking-
based search procedure. It attempts to extend the current execution by
generating new events in a depth-first manner. If the current execution
cannot be extended, Auto-Explore saves a snapshot and backtracks. If the
current execution can be extended, but all the targets of the extension have
been seen before, the procedure also backtracks. The snapshots created by
Auto-Explore are used by the interactive analysis. If the execution can be
extended, new paths are added to the trail and the search continues.
Interactive model exploration
Interactive-Explore is a user-guided search procedure. The user is shown a
graph and the current location in the graph. Input from the user is relayed
to the application to extend the current execution. If the user navigates
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two activities labelled with an intent is an abstraction of all
executions that start in the first activity and lead to the second
by sending the intent.
The AIG coverage problem for length 0, which we call
activity coverage, is to construct an AIG that overapproximates
an application’s behaviour and generate executions that visit
every activity. A statically constructed AIG may not be an
overapproximation because the target of an intent cannot
always be resolved statically, and because some intents are
sent by the system.
User interfaces for applications are implemented using
activities. The activity coverage problem can be viewed as
asking for all user interfaces in an application to be explored. A
similar problem is addressed in model-based GUI testing [18].
also solves is to cover every edge in an EFG, which amounts
to firing every event handler at least once. The first application
of static analysis to construct models for GUI testing is yet to
appear in print [4], [3].
Example 2: Figure 9 illustrates the AIG for SyncMyPix.
This graph was generated automatically by our static analysis.
Each vertex represents an activity. [Vijay : finish this] For
example, the activity The edge from first to second shows that
static analysis can detect an execution that leads from the main
activity to the activity for modifying preferences. The edge is
not detected by static analysis because [Vijay : ]
C. Event Flow Graph Coverage
An Event Flow Graph (EFG) represents temporal depen-
dencies between firing of event handlers as well as how event
handlers enable and disable each other. EFGs have been used
in model-based testing of GUIs [18]. The EFG for an Android
application consists of vertices labelled by components and
edges labelled with event handlers.
A vertex in an EFG represents all states in which a compo-
nent is running. Unlike a AIG, an edge in an EFG is labelled
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Runtime analysis generates a set of executions T to cover G. The runtime
analysis consists of an automatic analysis, which generates certain events and
an interactive analysis driven by the user, which generates all other events.
with an event handler represents all possible executions in
which that event handler fires. AIGs and EFGs have the same
sets of vertices, but edges in an EFG represent more precise
information than those in an AIG. The EFG coverage problem
we study is to cover every edge in an EFG, which amounts to
firing every event handler at least once.
IV. STATICALLY AIDED INTERACTIVE DYNAMIC
ANALYSIS
We present Statically Aided Interactive Dynamic Analysis
(SAI¨DA), a new technique for exploring program behaviour,
and a system that implements this technique. This section de-
scribes SAI¨DA and Section V provides implementation details.
Overview of SAI¨DA
A schematic overview of SAI¨DA is shown in Figure 2.
SAI¨DA allows for a static analyzer, a dynamic analysis, and
an interactive testing tool to interact provided a few interface
functions are implemented. We take as input an application P ,
and a bound k, and produce as output a pair (G, T ), consisting
of a model G and a set of traces T . We calculate the coverage
metric metric(G, T, k) from G and T .
We begin analysis by using static analysis to construct
a model G. The model may not overapproximate program
behaviour for reasons identified earlier. The graph is used by
runtime analysis to generate executions, in an attempt to max-
imise coverage. If runtime analysis discovers an execution not
represented by G, information about the execution is conveyed
to the static analyzer. The static analyzer uses this information
to improve the model. Our analysis alternates between model
construction and model coverage until the runtime analysis
achieves full coverage or the measured coverage stabilises.
We describe the algorithmic details of SAI¨DA next.
The main data structure
All information about the analysis is stored in a data
structure shown below.
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Figure 3.4: Architecture of Crowdblaze. The translator is implemented with
third-party tools, but all o her components were developed by the authors.
The instrume tation tool transforms the application for runtime analysis.
to part of the model that can be traversed automatically, a snapshot is
saved for Auto-Explore. If all activities have been explored, or if the user is
stuck in a region of model without making progress, Interactive-Explore saves
a snapshot, marks that activity as explored, and continues.
If each procedure mentioned above is implemented, sa¨ıda is instantiated
by running Auto-Explore and Interactive-Explore in arallel. The scheme be-
low doe not require static analysis to be executed in parallel, but in our
implementation, each process runs on a separate server.
3.4 Crowdblaze: a sa¨ıda tool
Implementing the procedure from the previous section is challenging because
of the inte action bet een different comp n ts, and the complexi y of in-
formation communicated. The main contribution of our tool Crowdblaze is
in facilitating the communication between different analyses. The second
contribution is a new dynami and static analysis for A droid applications.
The architecture of Crowdblaze is depicted in Figure 3.4. Crowdblaze re-
ceives as input the Application Under Test (aut) and a bound and produces
a set of traces and a model as output. The outpu is used to calculate cover-
age, also show in the figure. The entities in the system can be divided into
four categories, for program transformation, static, dynamic and interactive
analysis. We describe each below.
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Algorithm 1: Statically Aided Interactive Dynamic Analysis
SA¨IDA(P : An Android application)
G← Statically-Analyse(P, ∅, ∅)
foreach activity A in G do
Load A in the emulator
take snapshot for dynamic analysis
while Interactive-Explore snapshots exist do
S ← load interactive analysis snapshot
Auto-Explore(S)
‖
while Auto-Explore snapshots exist do
S ← load dynamic analysis snapshot
Interactive-Explore(S)
Auto-Explore(P :Application, G: Model,
T :Set of traces, τ: Current trace)
foreach length k path pi from current (τ) do
push (pi,trail)
pi ← top(trail)
if automatable (pi) then
τ ← extend(τ, pi), T ← T ∪ {τ}
else
take shapshot for interactive analysis
if covered (G,T, k) then return
else if stuck (G,T, k) then return
pop(trail)
return
Interactive-Explore(P :App, G: Graph, T :Set of traces)
foreach edge e from current (τ) do
push (e,trail)
e← get-user-event
τ ← extend(τ, e), T ← T ∪ {τ}
traversed(current(τ))← true
if automatable(τ, e) for some e or stuck (G,T, k) then
take snapshot for dynamic analysis
traversed(e)← true
return
Statically-Analyse(P :App, G: Graph, T :Set of traces)
return Graph H that includes G and overapproximates T
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Translation to jimple
We first translate Dalvik bytecode to Jimple, a format used by the soot
framework for Java analysis. Jimple is an intermediate language for static
analysis. Unlike Java bytecode, which contains over 200 instructions and
is stack based, Jimple contains only 15 instructions is register based, hence
easier to manipulate and analyse. We use a third-party tool dex2jar to
generate Java bytecode from Dalvik bytecode, and soot to translate . jar to
Jimple.
3.4.1 The instrumentation tool
We use instrumentation to enable runtime analyses to track only relevant
information about an application. Our instrumentation tool takes as input
a Jimple file and produces a repackaged Android application as output. The
new application extends the behavior of the original application by sending
notifications to the analysis environment when behavior relevant to cover-
age occurs. Algorithmically, we use instrumentation to implement current(τ)
from Table 3.1. There are two types of notification required for a given
model.
The first type is model coverage notification. Such notifications are re-
quired for the runtime analyses to know which parts of the model are visited.
Model coverage notifications are used to update the numerator of the cover-
age metric.
The second type is model update notification. If the runtime analysis dis-
covers behavior that is not in the model, we need to relay sufficient detail
to the static analysis to improve the model. For example, knowing which
activities were visited is insufficient to aid static analysis. We need to also
know where the intent originated, and, if possible, its target. Model update
notifications change the denominator of the coverage metric.
For aig coverage, we send model coverage notifications when onResume
and onPause are called. These event handlers are, respectively, the pre- and
post-dominators of all states in which an activity is running. It suffices to
instrument these.
Model update notifications are more involved because there are many types
of event handlers, some registered dynamically, which may send intents. Ev-
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ery implementation of event handlers for click events must implement the
ClickListener interface. We instrument all classes implementing this interface
to send notifications when click events occur. The other instrumentation
points include event handlers in subclasses of DialogClick, OptionsMenu and
ContextMenu. By tracking sequences of notifications, the runtime analyses
will know the entire history of activity transitions and event handlers caus-
ing those transitions.
3.4.2 The static analyzer
Our static analyzer operates on Jimple. We do not use soot for static analysis
and only use it as a front end to generate Jimple. We implement three types
of control flow analysis.
First, we use an explicit control-flow analysis to find event handlers in an
application and the intents they send. This analysis follows control flow paths
that are explicit in the application code to detect call sites for registering
event handlers and sending intents.
When user or system events occur, the Android system calls methods such
as onClick and startActivity . The flow of control to such methods is implicit.
We implement an implicit control flow analysis to detect if the system code
calling these event handlers triggers a transition to another activity. We
implemented this analysis by examining cases where static analysis failed
and by consulting the Android SDK.
The two analyses above only determine the call site for sending an intent or
registering an event handler. We combine constant propagation and pointer
analysis in an intent analysis that resolves the targets of such calls. Finally,
the static analyzer runs as a web-service that receives queries from runtime
analyses and sends back responses.
3.4.3 The dynamic analysis process
The dynamic analysis process loads snapshots from a repository and extends
the current test until no further progress is made. To focus on coverage,
we use an iterative backtracking-based search procedure. When a snapshot
is loaded, an instrumented application under test (aut) is executed in an
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Android emulator. Notifications sent by the application are relayed to the
system by the adb bridge provided by the emulator. The functions in Table 3.1
are implemented by a driver process that executes outside the emulator. The
driver sends queries to the emulator to determine the status of the aut and
to extend the current test. The function current is implemented by receiving
notification from the instrumented app.
The function extend is implemented by querying the emulator for the using
methods such as getHierarchyViewer and getFocusedWindow. If a widget in the
current view is clickable, we use bounding box information to compute x and
y coordinates for the widget and generate click and tap events. The function
automatable is implemented by checking if the are possibilities to extend the
current trace by querying the emulator.
We implement stuck by tracking two types of information about the current
execution. If the current activity in the emulator does not belong to the aut,
we know that another application has been launched, which usually indicates
that user input is expected. In this case, stuck returns true. The second type
of information is internal to the application. For each vertex current(τ) that
has been visited by an execution, we record the set of event handlers that
were fired for the execution to navigate away from the vertex. If the model
is not covered and the set of event handlers associated with a vertex does
not change, we know that the analysis repeatedly exploring the same paths
in the model without making progress. In this case, stuck returns true.
3.5 The interactive analysis server
The bulk of our implementation effort was devoted to implementing a web-
based interactive analysis. The server consists of a web interface for users
to interact with the aut and a dynamic analysis environment. The server
loads auts from a snapshot database, allows the user to explore paths in an
application, and saves a shapsnot.
Interface display
The web-interface relays inputs from the user to the aut and display updates
from the emulator to the browser. The interface seen by the user during
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Figure 3.5: Loading page for the web-based interactive test environment
interactive analysis of the CNet application is shown in Figure 3.5. Vertices
in the graph are coloured blue if they are visited, red if they have not been
visited. The vertex covered by the current execution is yellow.
Since the aut is loaded from a snapshot database populated by dynamic
analysis, some vertices may already have been visited when the aut is first
shown to the user. By providing a graphical model and a goal (coverage),
we allow the user to treat testing as a game.
Event and screen capture
The user generates input events using the mouse or keyboard. Mouse clicks
are interpreted as tap and drags as swipes. Text can be entered using a
soft-keyboard displayed on the screen or the keyboard.
These events are relayed to the application to update the display of the
phone and the model. The refresh rate for the display, measured in Frames
Per Second (fps), has the greatest impact on user experience. We experi-
mented with several techniques for updating the display seen by the user and
found two to be effective. The first is to stream video from the emulator’s
display to the browser. The second is to send screenshots of the emulator
screen to the browser. The first solution is network and graphics card inten-
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Figure 3.6: CrowdBlaze workflow.
sive but is necessary for games and streaming video applications. The second
solution suffices for applications such as Facebook, Yelp and Craigslist.
3.5.1 CrowdBlaze workflow
Figure 3.6 illustrates the workflow of CrowdBlaze. To start a test, a tester
request a test job from crowdsourcing websites such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk [22] in phase 1. In phase 2 the crowdsoucing website gives the tester
brief introductions about the test and navigate tester to CrowdBlaze’s test
server through phase 3. In phase 4 tester interacts with CrowdBlaze to
complete the test. For a given Android app testing task, CrowdBlaze test
server will switch between automatic blackbox testing and human testing.
In phase 5 and 6 CrowdBlaze communicates with crowdsouring server
about the quality of the test and pay the tester.
In building CrowdBlaze, we have two primary goals. First, we strive to
make CrowdBlaze a practical system, by which we mean the human tester
should be able to interact with the Android app in real time.
Second, we want to bridge the gap between automatic testing and human
based testing efficiently. We want to improve test efficiency and quality
by testing apps as much as possible using automatic blackbox testing with
human testers kick in whenever automatic tests can not guarantee good test
quality.
45
  
Browser
CrowdBlaze Test Server
Screen
Feedback
Service
Android
Emulator
TestUnit
UI
Replayer
reCaptcha
Page
Web Server
Test
Session
Database
Testing
Page
CrowdBlaze
Dispatcher fork
UI
Proxy
1
2
6a
3 4
5
6b
A
B
C
Figure 3.7: Design of CrowdBlaze test server.
3.5.2 CrowdBlaze test server
Figure 3.7 illustrates the design details of CrowdBlaze test server. Crowd-
Blaze test server consists a web server, an array of TestUnits, and a Test
Session Database.
When a tester asks the web server for a test from a browser in step 1,
tester will first be asked to fill out a reCaptcha [26] which prevents denial-of-
service attacks [5]. After the user answers the reCaptcha correctly, the web
server generates a testing page in step 2 and fork out one TestUnit using
its CrowdBlaze Dispatcher in step 3 and 4. Meanwhile, the webserver will
create one unique session identifier for this tester.
The TestUnit consists of several different processes such as a UI Replayer
(explained 3.5.3), an Anroid emulator that runns the app to be tested and a
screen feedback service (details in 3.5.4) which deliver the Android Emula-
tor’s screen output to tester’s browser in real time in step 6b.
Combining testing page components sent in step 6a and 6b, tester can
interact with the test page shown in Figure 3.5.
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3.5.3 UI handling
The tester can interact with the emulated phone using mouse and keyboard
on the test page. For example, he/she can use mouse click to start apps,
drag the mouse to mimic a finger slide when unlocking the phone screen and
type words he/she would like to search using keyborad.
The Javascript programs running inside the test page capture and send
tester’s UI actions to the UI Proxy running inside the web server, as shown
in dotted step A in Figure 3.7. The UI Proxy does certain sanity checks and
relay a UI action to the UI Replayer running inside the TestUnit in step B.
UI Replayer then feed the Android emulator with this UI action to drive it
forward.
3.5.4 Screen feedback service
The goal of designing screen feedback service is to deliver Android emulator’s
screen to tester’s browser in real time. For example, when pressing “home”
button to switch from one running app to the home screen, the user should
be able to see the running app window shrinking smoothly.
Our design uses video encoding to stream the emulator’s screen to tester’s
browser in real time. In detail, we run each emulator in a separate X server
implemented using Xephyr [38] and use FFmpeg and FFserver [7] to encode
its display into a video stream and deliver it to tester’s browser.
3.6 Threats to validity
The main threats to the external validity of our evaluation is that our experi-
mental results may not apply to other applications or other mobile platforms.
To enhance external validity, we have chosen popular popular applications
from different categories. The main threats to the internal validity is our
collection of manually generated results. These results are obtained from
people with different expertise that we are not aware of. To enhance internal
validity, we randomized the way tests were assigned to people online, and
have made the system available online to obtain a wide selection of users.
We have also conducted tests with members in a research lab who are famil-
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iar with smartphones to observe differences and discrepancies. Additionally,
we carefully checked our system to reduce internal validity due to software
defects.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
4.1 Evaluation of Cocktail
This section describes our evaluation of Cocktail. In our evaluation, we
measure Cocktail’s ability to withstand attacks, ability to withstand replica
crashes, Cocktail’s compatibility with existing websites and the overhead.
We run all experiments on a 2.80GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 8GB
of memory and 220GB SATA hard drive. For our performance experiments
we use Ubuntu 10.04, and Firefox 3.6.6, Opera 10.60, and Google Chrome
7.0 as Cocktail’s replica browsers. For our security experiments, we use a
vulnerable browser version as one of our browser replica on a corresponding
operating system.
4.1.1 Performance
To measure performance, we measure the page load latency time for Cocktail
and compare to the page load latency times for each of our replicas running
alone. We test the page load latency time for seven popular pages as shown
in Figure 4.1. The reported page load latency time is the average of ten runs
for each site.
Page load latency is defined as the time between when a user initiates a
visit to a new web page and when the browser “onload” event fires. In our
experiments we use our Firefox replica as our display replica and measure
the page load latency times for that individual replica. Figure 4.1 shows the
average page load latency time for our Cocktail display replica. We also show
the page load latency time for Firefox, Google Chrome and Opera running
individually outside of Cocktail on the same hardware and same operating
system. For our Firefox replica to reach the “onload” event means that
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Figure 4.1: Page load latency comparison for Cocktail and individual
browsers.
for each network request at least one other replica has requested the same
network resources as our Firefox replica.
Overall, Cocktail adds 31.5% overhead on average to the page load latency
for the seven sites we tested comparing to Firefox running alone. youtube.
com was the slowest site – Cocktail added 52.6% overhead , which was the
largest percent slowdown in our experiments. This slowdown is because the
order of network requests causes Firefox in Cocktail to block for some network
requests.
4.1.2 Reliability
We designed Cocktail to improve reliability by allowing the system to re-
main running even if one of our replicas crashes, similar to other replicated
execution systems [51, 48, 59, 104, 79, 123]. To measure Cocktail’s ability
to withstand browser crashes, we trigger a bug in our Firefox replica, a bug
in our Opera replica, and we inject faults in all of our replicas using the
DieHard fault injection tool [51]. Table 4.1 shows that Cocktail successfully
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Fault type Individual
browser
Cocktail
CVE-2009-
0071 [10]
Firefox 3.0.6
crash
masked
Opera Crash
[25]
Opera 10.10
crash
masked
Fault Injec-
tions
Firefox
Crash
masked
Fault Injec-
tions
Opera Crash masked
Fault Injec-
tions
Chrome
Crash
masked
Table 4.1: Reliability test results for Cocktail.
masks the reliability bugs in Firefox and in Opera, and for injected faults on
each of our replicas.
4.1.3 Security analysis
To measure Cocktail’s ability to withstand attacks, we exploit our Firefox
replica using four real-world exploits that represent four broad classes of
attacks.
First, we tested Cocktail against a category of attacks that requires user’s
interaction to succeed. We created a page containing JavaScript code that
exploits CVE-2009-3076 [14] targeting Firefox 3.0.x(x<14) on Ubuntu 8.04.
Our attack page entices the user to click on a button in a dialog window.
When the user clicks on this button, this attack installs a malicious PKCS11
module into the browser, compromising the integrity of the cryptography. In
our experiment, the dialog did not pop up in our Opera or Chrome replica,
because they did not contain this vulnerability. Our display voting algorithm
catches the dramatic visual differences between replica displays.
Second, we tested Cocktail against a remote code execution attack category
that runs automatically, without user interaction. We created a web page
containing CVE-2009-2477 [13] heap overflow attack exploiting Firefox 3.5 on
a Ubuntu 8.04 machine. We crafted the heap overflow attack to launch our
payload code that tries to download a trojan file from a web site. Although
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our Firefox replica did attempt to download the file, the Chrome and Opera
replicas never attempt to download this file because they were not vulnerable,
thus Cocktail squashes this malicious HTTP request.
Third, we investigated Cocktail’s ability to withstand DOS attacks. We
crafted a DOS attack [9] against Firefox 3.0.4 on Ubuntu Linux 8.04. This
attack causes the browser to run into an endless loop blocking access to the
UI. Although the Firefox replica in Cocktail stops responding, the Opera and
Chrome replicas continue to run, defeating this attack successfully.
Fourth, we tested an attack that uses a browser vulnerability to bypass the
same origin policy. We tested Cocktail against a cookie stealing vulnerability
CVE-2007-0981 [8] targeting Firefox 2.0.0.1. Interestingly, Cocktail defeats
this attack because Cocktail uses a proxy for network requests. This spe-
cific attack exploits the inconsistency between location.hostname and DNS
look up results when there is a null character in location.hostname in Fire-
fox 2.0.0.1. Specifically, a site with “evil.com\0x00www.victim.com” will be
treated as “evil.com” for DNS look up, whereas the site is instead treated as
a subdomain as “victim.com” by the browser. This is because Firefox 2.0.0.1
treats null characters as part of local.hostname whereas underlying C/C++
implementing DNS look up code treat null as the end of the string. There-
fore, the browser can send cookies belonging to “victim.com” to “evil.com”.
However, Firefox in Cocktail uses our proxy for network connections and
our proxy did not have this vulnerability. However, even if a cookie steal-
ing attack succeeds in one replica, we believe the network voting algorithm
of Cocktail will detect it by observing different network requests from the
replicas.
4.1.4 Compatibility
An integral component of evaluating Cocktail is to assess its compatibility
with existing websites. It is important to consider compatibility because, in
Cocktail, browser functionality is modified, which may break web developer
assumptions about how the browser will interpret code. Additionally, there
could still be non-determinism left in the browser that is not handled, which
could lead to incompatibility issues. Therefore, in this section we analyze
each of the major client side modifications of Cocktail and discuss the poten-
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Evaluation Type Result
Dynamic Functionality
Non-user-interactive 100%
User-Interactive
Keyboard Input 99%
Mouse Clicks 99%
Web application replication
live.com: login, check email X
amazon.com: login, navigate,
browse items, and view cart
X
yahoo.com: web search,
interact with Javascript
and navigation site
X
Resources
Site content acquisition 98/100 sites
paypal.com 43/46 web resources
nytimes.com 85/86 web resources
Ad content acquisition 96/100 sites
Rendering 100%
Web Standards Testing
Acid3
100/100, 99/100, 100/100
(Chrome, Firefox,
and Opera Replica scores)
Table 4.2: Results Summary. Results are given in terms of successes out of
the total number of objects evaluated unless otherwise stated.
tial problems arising from them. Additionally, we describe the experimental
results of testing Cocktail on the top 100 websites (as defined by alexa.com).
Our goal is to provide ample evidence that Cocktail is usable as a primary
browser with today’s websites.
To evaluate Cocktail’s compatibility, we discuss how the modifications to
client side functionality lead to potential incompatibilities. In general, incom-
patibilities manifest to the user as either missing or buggy dynamic function-
ality (e.g., JavaScript or AJAX), or web resources failing to load because of
a lack of consensus by the replicas (e.g., non-determinism in URL forma-
tion). We divide dynamic functionality into two classes: user-interactive and
non-user-interactive functionality. Non-user-interactive functionality is the
activity present on a page without any user interaction (e.g., updating news
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feeds). We make this distinction because it allows us to separate compatibil-
ity issues due to UI replication from other client side modifications. Resource
related problems are characterized by missing web page content. The client
side modifications can impact how URLs are generated for resource requests
and, if inconsistent, will generate valid requests that are subsequently re-
jected by the Cocktail voter due to lack of consensus.
In general we found Cocktail to be comparable to existing web browsers
in its ability to successfully interact with and render web pages. Table 4.2
displays an overview of our experimental results, which were obtained by
manually visiting and testing the top 100 global websites as identified by
alexa.com. We assess each website with respect to dynamic functionality
and resource related issues, and report results with regards to the potential
underlying causes. Each particular problem and results are discussed in detail
in the following sections. In addition to manually testing Cocktail we also
examine Cocktail’s score on the common web standard test acid3 [1].
Methodology
In this evaluation we test the top 100 websites for both dynamic functionality
and resource related competencies. For each site we compare the results of
evaluating Cocktail to that of a standard Firefox browser. If the results
diverge from Firefox’s results then we determine a fault for the given site
test and mark it down as such. To test for non-user-interactive dynamic
functionality we view the page for ten seconds, verifying that the functionality
matches that of an unmodified Firefox version. To test for user-interactive
dynamic functionality we examine Cocktail’s ability to replicate dynamic
functionality as a byproduct of mouse clicks and keyboard input.
In terms of resource related issues we analyze web pages with respect to
the resources that it successfully fetches from the Internet. A web page is
comprised of an initial landing page (e.g., an HTML file) and then a set of
resources that are downloaded for insertion into that page (e.g., hyperlinked
content, images, videos, etc.). We analyze Cocktail’s ability to obtain all
resources in a page and render them on that page. In our experiments we
replace pornography sites with the next highest ranked sites from alexa.com.
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Results and Discussion
Synchronized Deterministic Time As discussed in Section 2.5.5, to
handle non-determinism due to time dependent functionality we discretized
time. The primary issue related to compatibility here is that a large percent-
age of websites use JavaScript time functionality. In general we observed two
types of uses of JavaScript time: to create randomness for seeding dynamic
content (generating dynamic links to ads), and for dynamically updating page
content via JavaScript/AJAX. Problems occur on any code that employs time
intervals less than Cocktail’s discrete time interval of three seconds. Cock-
tail’s deterministic time functionality will allow time based changes to occur,
but only in three second intervals, which manifests in delayed functionality.
In order to improve the resolution of Date.getTime() we can employ a more
robust solution of a distributed clock.
In order to evaluate the impact of deterministic time in Cocktail, we ana-
lyze the set of functionality that a given website exhibits without user inter-
action. When including interaction the problem or associated set of issues
are related to UI replication, which will be discussed in a subsequent sec-
tion. Our results indicate that sites using JavaScript time functionality for
seeding content do not experience any problematic behavior, and work fully
with Cocktail. Furthermore, for seeding dynamic content, Cocktail’s time
methods provide consistent results in all three browsers and maintain full
compatibility. In terms of the second area of interest, JavaScript/AJAX dy-
namic updating of page content, Cocktail successfully handles all top 100
sites.
Deterministic Math.random() Problems arising from modifying
Math.random() include any type of functionality that requires randomness
to function properly. In our evaluation, in which we analyzed non-user-
interactive JavaScript and content acquisition, Cocktail did not incur any
problems emerging from modifications to the Math.random() function in ei-
ther content acquisition or dynamic page functionality. This does not rule out
the potential for issues, but shows the viability and robustness of Cocktail at
handling top websites. Recall that the goal of these modifications is to elim-
inate non-determinism across the replicas, not necessarily non-determinism
with respect to the website code. As long as the replicas all deterministi-
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cally select the next random number they will be consistent, maintaining
compatibility, but still present random numbers to the function callers.
Browser Identification Normalization In Section 2.5.5 we discussed
modifications that normalize replicas so that each browser appears to be the
same browser, which minimizes browser specific functionality. The types of
problems that could occur include issues with content acquisition, as well as
modified dynamic functionality. For example, website code could traverse a
specific Firefox only code path resulting in different output based upon the
navigator.userAgent property. In practice Cocktail did not experience any
reduced functionality on the top 100 sites due to browser normalization.
UI Replication The goal of the replication system is to take user input
from the control replica and invoke the same actions in the other two replicas.
The control replica sends the event information to the other replicas, which
then invokes the specific action. The replication, if incorrectly working, can
be a source of both dynamic functionality and content acquisition errors.
Evaluating the replication system is challenging because it is infeasible
to traverse all code paths on a given website. Furthermore, replication has
complex interactions with elements in the page. If a specific event replicates
correctly on a given page there is no guarantee that it will correctly replicate
on another webpage. Therefore, we evaluate replication by verifying that a
minimal subset of events are correctly replicated in each of the replicas. The
specific events we test on all 100 sites include keyboard input and mouse
clicks. Most user interaction events can be represented as one of these, and
as such we feel as though this subset is representative of a major portion of
dynamic interaction between the user and a webpage. Based on this subset of
functionality Cocktail faithfully replicates events and dynamic functionality
on 99 out of 100 sites (sina.com.cn being the lone site missing functionality).
It is important to note that we only tested the front page of the top 100
sites. Therefore, in an effort to show the efficacy of Cocktail’s replication
we evaluate Cocktail’s ability to execute common web application tasks. We
tested three sites live.com, amazon.com, and yahoo.com. For the first two
we successfully login and execute common tasks for the particular web ap-
plication. On yahoo.com we browse news items and interact with pages in
an effort to examine the viability of Cocktail, and find that we can perform
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general navigation without error. Table 4.2 displays the exact tasks.
Voting Recall that the voting mechanism rejects any web request that does
not have a majority vote. If any two of the replicas either fail to make a given
request, or in some way have different URLs for the same content area (e.g.,
ad, image, video) then that web resource will be missing from the rendered
page. The source of rejections is client side non-determinism, which are those
things that Cocktail does not handle. The results discussed here are due to
non-determinism in the replicas after Cocktail modifications, and not from
the client side sources as discussed in the previous section.
Our experiments reveal that a primary source of non-determinism causing
resource fetch failures is ad content areas in web pages. Ad content by
nature is non-deterministic, and in the cases where content is missed, the
non-determinism comes from ads that are being generated by an ad server of
different origin than the webpage being viewed. Although, this was the source
of Cocktail’s greatest problems, Cocktail is successful at correctly obtaining
all resources for 94 out of 100 sites evaluated. Note that the only missing
content on these sites is ad content and not all ads failed to load for the six
sites.
Site content was another type of resource experiencing fetch issues. Out
of the top 100 sites only two sites, nytimes.com and paypal.com, experienced
a site content related miss. nytimes.com successfully loads 85 out of 86
resources indicating that most content and features are still available on the
page. The one resource that fails on nytimes.com is a flash video player.
paypal.com succeeds on 43 out of 46 resources, and is incompatible due to
non-determinism in the way that flash plugins identify themselves to the
browser. Normalization of the flash players would eliminate this issue. Table
4.2 displays our results on content acquisition analysis.
4.2 Evaluation of CrowdBlaze
In this section, we evaluate Crowdblaze. Due to space restrictions, we use
acronyms in tables and plots and only report some of our findings. We
abbreviate interactive analysis to ia, statically aided interactive analysis to
saia, and so on.
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Figure 4.2: Number of activities discovered by sa¨ıda
Experimental setup
We evaluate Crowdblaze on the applications in Table 4.3. We use a key,
referring to each application by its first letter and refer to Craigslist and
CNet as c and cn, respectively. The applications were downloaded from and
were among the top 20 downloads in the official Android market in 2012. We
ran experiments on a Dell Optiplex 990 desktop with an Intel i7-2600 CPU
running at 3.40GHz, 16GB DDR3 memory and an Intel HD Graphics 2000
integrated graphics card. We streamed screenshots at 40 fps.
4.2.1 Evaluation of activity coverage
Activity coverage
Figure 4.2 summarises the number of activities visited by Crowdblaze. A
single unit on the x axis represents one activity. The gray region represents
dynamically discovered activities, the lined pattern represents interactively
discovered ones, and the sequence represents the interplay of dynamic and
interactive analysis.
The entry for Twitter shows that first, 15 activities were discovered by
dynamic analysis before the analysis was stuck. Then, one activity was dis-
covered by interactive analysis, and automatable was true for some aig edge,
so a snapshot was sent to dynamic analysis. The second run of dynamic anal-
ysis discovered 10 activities, the second run of interactive analysis discovered
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5 activities, and then, stuck was true for both dynamic and interactive anal-
ysis, so no further progress was made.
The complete experimental results are summarised in Table 4.3. The col-
umn # represents the total number of activities declared in the manifest.
We also show the number of activities covered by sa¨ıda, with a breakdown
into the number covered by dynamic and by interactive analysis, irrespective
of how many iterations were required. We emphasise that our main contri-
bution is not the details of each component but in providing an automatic,
interactive environment and infrastructure for combining these analyses.
Running time
The time required for computing coverage is shown in Table 4.4 and is vi-
sualised to display progress in Figure 4.3. A single line represents a run
of sa¨ıda, with different line styles representing different applications. The
vertical axis displays the value of the coverage metric. A solid black circle
represents an activity that was discovered by interactive analysis. Each line
captures the interplay of dynamic and interactive analysis over time.
The results show that, in general, the automatic analysis is able to navigate
through several activities before it gets stuck, and that a little interactive
input is required to make more progress. The surprising insight from these
figures is that when combined as shown, the rate at which the dynamic and
interactive analyses discover new activities is not as different as one may
expect.
Crowd sourcing interactive analysis
To better evaluate the benefit of combining the interactive and dynamic anal-
ysis, we posted tasks on mobileworks (www.mobileworks.com) and invited
users using local mailing lists. Tests were performed by 75 different users
from locations that included Berkeley, Georgetown (Guyana), Venice (Italy)
and Kingston (Jamaica).
The comparative results of our study are summarised in the eight graphs
in Figure 4.3. The graphs show the number of activities covered on the
y axis and the time required on the x axis. We compared four different
analyses. In the purely interactive analysis (ia), users were asked to test an
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name #
activities covered running time (s)
total da ia da ia total
Video Hot Mix 6 6 5 1 124 6 130
Craigslist 13 12 11 1 514 4 518
CNet 12 8 8 0 351 N/A 351
Amazon 19 17 15 2 398 83 481
Weather 19 11 8 3 485 350 835
Twitter 33 31 25 6 1807 936 2743
Evernote 46 38 30 8 1544 354 1898
Yelp 75 46 30 16 1819 671 2490
Table 4.3: Applications used, the total number of activities, activities
covered by by sa¨ıda split by dynamic and interactive, and running time.
application without being shown an aig, In the statically aided interactive
analysis (saia) users were shown the aig but dynamic analysis was not used.
The graphs also show the effect of not having a user and our data for sa¨ıda.
The clearest conclusion we can draw is that sa¨ıda consistently obtains
greater coverage than all other techniques. In Twitter and Evernote, all
techniques performed at the same rate, but obtained less coverage. In the
case of Amazon, the users achieved almost the same coverage as sa¨ıda but
required longer. In almost all cases, sada and sa¨ıda cover activities at the
same rate, but sada cannot progress beyond a threshold where user input is
required.
We also logged the actions that were typically required for sa¨ıda to progress.
They can be classified into two categories. Actions required by all applica-
tions included login to a website, filling in captchas, and navigating between
applications. Actions specific to applications included typing approximate
geographical information (Weather), entering credit card information (Ama-
zon), writing notes (Evernote), and writing tweets (Twitter).
Static and dynamic analysis
We now discuss two examples where the combination of static and dynamic
analysis led to new activities being discovered and revealed interesting appli-
cation behavior. The results can be compared to [53], where a combination of
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Figure 4.3: Number of activities discovered over time. The upper two plots
show the time required by sa¨ıda for 8 applications. The black dots are
single activities covered by a user.
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key
activities covered running time (s)
ia sada saia sa¨ıda ia sada saia sa¨ıda
v 5 5 4 6 114 124 305 130
c 4 11 3 12 96 514 354 518
cn 6 8 4 8 283 351 1082 351
a 4 14 6 17 17 361 370 481
w 6 5 4 11 340 389 274 835
t 2 15 2 31 23 575 92 2743
e 3 14 4 38 18 500 122 1898
y 12 25 12 46 462 1511 294 2490
Table 4.4: Comparison of the activities covered and the time required by
independently running components of sa¨ıda.
static and dynamic analysis was used get better information about reflective
method calls.
In SyncMyPix, the intent sent from MainActivity to DonateActivity could not
be resolved automatically. Intent sending to FacebookLoginWebView occurs in
the same code, so once dynamic analysis reports one of the solid edges in
Figure 3.2 being observed, the static analyzer can detect the other.
A second example is Video Hot Mix. Figure 4.4 illustrates a fragment
of the aig, as computed by Crowdblaze. Intents to activities on the right
could not be detected statically because they are invoked by user events
that are handled by a Javascript interface. Information about the Javascript
interface alone is insufficient to resolve intents because the method post in the
figure is called by the Android runtime. Once dynamic analysis detects that
addJavaScriptInterface and post are called before the intent is sent, the static
analyzer can follow calls in the body of these methods and derive all three
intents shown in the figure.
We are not aware of any technique that can analyse such sophisticated
interaction between activities. The use of JavaScript also has implications for
security, because of vulnerabilities contained in unexpected functionality.
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Direct Call (CG) Indirect Call (ICG) Intent Call (ACG)
Activity(com.videomix.it.vhm)
com.videomix.it.
vhm.onCreate()
com.videomix.it.
HomeJSBridge.showPreference()
addJavaScriptInterface
com.videomix.it.
HomeJSBridge.showTopVideos()
com.videomix.it.
HomeJSBridge.showFavorites()
com.videomix.it.
HomeJSBridge$8.run()
post
com.videomix.it.
HomeJSBridge$1.run()
post
com.videomix.it.
HomeJSBridge$4.run()
post
com.videomix.it.
vhm.showPreference()
com.videomix.it.
vhm.showTopVideos()
com.videomix.it.
vhm.showFavorites()
com.videomix.it.
vhm.showVideos()
addJavaScriptInterface addJavaScriptInterface
Activity(com.videomix.it.
Prefs)
Activity(com.videomix.it.
TopCats)
Activity(com.videomix.it.
CatVids)
startActivity(INTENT)
startActivity(INTENT)
startActivity(INTENT)
Figure 4.4: An Activity Intent Graph for Video Hot Mix. The vertices
represent activities and edges represent intents sent between activities.
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CHAPTER 5
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
5.1 Redundant software systems
Using redundancy to improve software systems has attracted big research
efforts in the past. In this section, we review several important approaches
related to the dissertation.
5.1.1 Byzantine fault tolerance systems
Byzantine fault [80] refers to the type of fault in which the components of
a system fail in arbitrary ways instead of just stop or crash. Early works
[105, 59] made byzantine fault tolerance practical and later works [123, 79]
proposed different optimizations.
Most of these systems are made for reliability and availability improve-
ments by running the same software on all replicas. The same replicas may
lead to correlated failures [104] in which every replica fail the same way. For
example, if there is a security vulnerability in the replicas, an attacker may
succeed in attacking all replicas and make their behavior look the same.
The difficulty of using different software for byzantine replicas is partly
due to the fact that finding different implementations of the same function-
ality for the replicas is hard. It requires three times as many programmers
to implement the same spec and converting one replica’s state to another
replica’s state for recovery can rely on implementation specific artifacts of
diverse replicas. One possible way for doing so is to use N-Version program-
ming which is explained in Section 5.1.2. BASE [104] uses opportunistic
N-Version programming by defining a common layer of abstraction for file
systems and databases to address some of these challenges, which provided
inspiration for Cocktail.
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5.1.2 N-Version programming
N-Version programming [61] is defined as the independent generation of
N >= 2 functionality equivalent programs from the same initial specification.
The independent generation is completed by N developers or groups which
does not communicate about that specific programming.
N-Version programming is an alternative approach to fault-avoidance (or
intolerance) [47] which eliminates software defects before execution. Due
to the complexity of software systems, it is still a hard problem today. N-
Version programming reduces the probablity of same software faults occuring
in multiple implementations.
Due to the cost of N independent implementation, existing similar software
systems are reused to build opportunistic N-Version programming [104] sys-
tems. EnvyFS [48] presents a N-Version file system for improved reliability.
Another example is BASE [104] which is explained in Section 5.1.1.
Apart from reusing existing systems, N-Variant systems [64] improve se-
curity by automatically building variant software instances and replicating
their executions. DieHard [51, 52] has a replication mode which runs several
software instances with one randomized memory manager in each of them.
Memory errors are hopefully caught as a result of differently randomized
layout of memory allocations.
5.2 Browser security and testing
A number of research efforts improved the security of web browsers. Browser-
Shield [101] rewrites suspicious script codes to safe equivalents with web-
proxy-based injection and rewriting. Tahoma [75] and OP [72] enforce dif-
ferent levels of separation in browser construction. NativeClient [122] and
Xax [67] provide built-in sandboxing techniques to contain potentially unsafe
code execution. Gazelle [116] and MashupOS [74] protect information from
one party from other parties’ access. Nozzle [100] detects heap spray attacks
with language-based techniques. StriderMonkey [118] builds honeyfarms for
browser exploit detection and SpyProxy [94] renders web contents before they
reach the user in a proxy-based architecture to detect malicious contents.
Cocktail is also related to some techniques used in browser testing. Sele-
nium [28] automates web app testing among different browsers by specificing
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the same UI inputs in test scripts. There are also “Hybrid” browsers such
as Lunascape and the Sogou browser with multiple layout engines to allow
users to choose a layout engine for each site, giving them more flexibility.
However, none of these systems focus on improving security by comparing
behaviors of different browsers.
5.3 Comparing browser on-screen display and web
page segmentation
Previous projects have studied using computer vision techniques to match
web pages. For example, Alhambra [113] uses the SIFT algorithm [85] to de-
tect differences resulting from different browser security policies. However,
the SIFT algorithm takes seconds to match and finds similarity features
among images caused by scaling and rotation, making it unsuitable for use
in real time. In the Web search area, two projects segment the rendered
web page into different layout areas with the help of the DOM information
[56, 60]. These projects trust the web page to be non-malicious, otherwise
can be easily confused by maliciously misplaced elements on the page. There
are also projects that build connections between browser visual displays and
security to check for inconsistencies between the DOM and what the browser
is displaying [69, 116, 108]. Some recent projects in the anti-phishing area [89]
compare the difference between phishing sites and corresponding authentic
sites using computer vision techniques such as 2D Haar wavelet transforma-
tion [109].
5.4 Crowdsourcing in software engineering
There have been a number of crowdsourcing-based techniques proposed in
different area of software engineering. TopCoder [33] attracts developers
from all over the world to work on a software development task through a
programming competition. Stolee et al. [110] proposed to carry out empir-
ical studies on software-engineering-related tools and techniques based on
crowdsourcing. These techniques do not focus on software testing, and as
far as we know, none of these techniques involve both human efforts and
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automatic tools to perform a certain software engineering task. There are
also papers [111] [103] that indicated some potential applications of crowd-
sourcing in software engineering, and some related research issues. However,
these papers did not present any concrete techniques or implementations.
5.5 Cooperative developer testing
Xiao et al. proposed Covana [120], which supports involving human aids
in an automatic testing tool. Specifically, Covana perform concolic testing
on a given application, and asks for developers’ help when a certain branch
cannot be covered due to complex predicates. However, Covana is not de-
signed for GUI apps, so it is not able to identify difficult cases in automatic
GUI testing. Furthermore, our system supports runtime-switching between
automatic testing tools and human testers which accelerate the whole testing
process. Moreover, our system allows human testers directly participate the
testing from crowdsourcing web sites.
5.6 Testing android apps
We noticed two pieces of recent works on testing Android apps. Anand et
al. [42] proposed a concolic-testing based system that automatically gener-
ates valid GUI event traces for exploring Android GUI apps. Amalfitano et
al. [41] proposed an view-model based testing approach that first extracts
a view model from the app and then tries to explore the app based on the
model. Our automatic testing tool may be improved by incorporating some
techniques from these works. However, none of these two approaches is able
to involve human-testing efforts when necessary, so it is difficult for them to
handle the some complex user interactions that require human intelligence
or knowledge.
Since most Android apps are GUI apps, and our approach focuses on
Android GUI apps, our work is closely related to existing automatic GUI
testing techniques. Menon presented a framework named Guitar that is
able to generate GUI test cases and to automatically run the cases [90]. A
number of extensions and adaptations [54, 92] have been done to improve this
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framework. Furthermore, as far as we know, although some of the approaches
use manually written view models [124], no existing GUI testing approaches
support involving human-testing efforts during the automatic testing process.
uTest [35] is a crowdsourcing based testing platform for GUI Testing, and
also supports testing Android apps. Compared to uTest, our system is able to
seamlessly incorporate the collected human efforts into an automatic testing
tool, so that we can save a large portion of human-testing efforts (which also
corresponds to the cost of the software developer).
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE WORK
Through the design and implementation of Cocktail and CrowdBlaze, we
explored the idea of using redundancy to improve browser security and mobile
testing. There are other research opportunities where redundant resources
can help, too. In this chapter, we discuss some of the possible future research
directions.
6.1 Web server security
As the backbones for today’s world wide web, web servers are still plagued
with serious security problems. As one example, attackers can modify the
contents of web pages using cross-site scripting [31] to deliver malicious code
to end users’ browsers.
Similar to browsers, existing web servers such as Apache, lighttpd and
nginx all implement common web standards like HTML, HTTP, etc.. With
the experience of Cocktail, we believe applying replicated execution to web
servers is valuable in improving web server security.
However, replicated execution of multiple web servers presents unique chal-
lenges. First, replicated execution causes side effects that are hard to elim-
inate. For complex web sites such as Amazon, web requests involve heavy
server side operations with side effects such as database modifications. Repli-
cated execution of different web servers may cause incorrect server states.
Second, it may be infeasible to replicate all components due to the large
amount of server data and heavy computation. For example, ideally the
databases used by web servers should also be replicated to use different im-
plementations. However, this may lead to multiplied work load on servers.
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6.2 Fine-grained Cocktail
Cocktail is now employing replicas at the level of whole browsers. Such a
design treats each browser as a blackbox and vote on their overall behav-
iors. This mechanism can conveniently reuse browser updates from original
vendors. However, since browsers observe common specifications at differ-
ent levels, it becomes interesting to investigate whether we can benefit from
introducing redundancy to browsers at finer granularity.
Browsers use HTTP protocol for transporting data, HTML, CSS and DOM
for data formatting and interpretation, JavaScript for dynamic contents.
Each of these components has multiple implementations in different web
browsers. Therefore, we can potentially replicate browser execution in a
more fine-grained, component-based manner. However, two difficulties make
this approach challenging. First, the interfaces among these components
may be unclear. For example, DOM implementation and JavaScript engine
in WebKit are heavily coupled with each other. Second, such interfaces are
hard to abstract uniformly among different browsers. As one example, V8
and SpiderMonkey JavaScript engines expose different interfaces. How to ab-
stract uniform component interfaces across different browsers is interesting
as well as challenging.
6.3 Improving coverage model for CrowdBlaze
CrowdBlaze is now having Activity-Intent-Graph (AIG) as the coverage
model to guide users. This level of abstraction reflects the Android UI com-
ponents used to construct apps. However, this model doesn’t reflect finer
information about the program such as which functions are being called. To
help the users with better coverage model about the program, we may use
other program analysis results such as control flow graph (CFG) and function
call graph (CG).
Comparing to AIG, CFG and CG are much bigger graphs and not as
intuitive to users. It is interesting to study how to construct coverage models
with CFG and CG information incorporated. One possible way of doing so
is to provide a coverage model with different level of details (LOD). For
example, we may first construct AIG as a coarse coverage model. Within
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each node of AIG, we can embed subgraphs of CFG and CG, which reflect
more fine-grained program information corresponding that specific activity.
Another problem for using CFG and CG is the overhead in collecting
runtime program information. For example, to measure coverage based on
CFG, we need to collect runtime information at basic block level. Previ-
ous works [39, 49] studied profiling program runtime information at basic
block level. It is interesting to study how to collect such information for
CrowdBlaze efficiently.
6.4 Improving reliability and security of medical
devices
Medical devices are of critical importance to patients’ health. Software bugs
may cause these devices to function incorrectly, which can put patients in
great danger. From 1985 to 1987, the therac-25 radiation therapy machine
ran into accidents in which patients got radiation burns [83]. Software bugs
such as race conditions and arithmetic overflows were among root causes of
those accidents. There were limited hardware mechanisms designed to stop
some errors at runtime, but they didn’t provide information such as which
components were causing trouble.
Because executions triggering these bugs were hard to reproduce, hospitals
and manufacturers weren’t able to diagnose these problems and kept the
machines running. It took six accidents before these machines were finally
stopped for deep error checking.
We believe redundancy is effective in improving medical system reliability
and security. For example, we can build the control system of therac-25 with
byzantine fault tolerance [59] mechanisms. This will prevent f faulty therac-
25 machine from hurting patients given there are 4f + 1 total replica therac-
25 softwares running at the same time. By logging down their communication
messages, it’s also easier to find which software instance goes wrong.
We can also try to build a new system for therac-25 with multiple indepen-
dent software designs and implementations through N-Version programming.
We can apply Principle 1 introduced in Section 1 to avoid changes to the soft-
ware system design for therac-25 to avoid changing the software of therac-25.
However, extracting meaningful states from therac-25 software for compari-
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son remains to be explored. Principle 2 can be applied to find abstractions
which target reliability features.
Another important reason for therac-25’s accidents was that the feedback
information to the operator was not clear and meaningful. For example, when
system noticed that something was wrong, it displayed a “MALFUNCTION”
message followed by a number from “1” to “64”. However, the user manual
did not explain or even address these error codes. The operator could try
“P” which resumed the operation. Because “MALFUNCTION” messages
were displayed frequently, operators were used to press “P” button when
real problems occured.
We should apply Principle 4 to the design of therac-25 software, to make
sure operator always get meanfuling feedback of the machine. The operator,
the hardware protection mechanism, and the controlling software should all
be able to independently and reliably evaluate the safety of the running
machine.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed three big categories of future research directions.
The first category is to improve security using other redundant web servers.
This direction uses our experiences learnt in this dissertation to help build
new systems.
The second category focuses on improving Cocktail and CrowdBlaze them-
selves. Fine-grained Cocktail can help us understand how to construct uni-
form interfaces among components inside browsers. This will help us build
browsers in better ways. Improving coverage model for CrowdBlaze can help
us to collect test data with more details which are useful in debugging and
optimizing Android apps.
The third category discusses applying the techniques and experiences learned
from this thesis to improve medical device security and reliability. When
analysing the problems occured in therac-25 accidents, we apply principles
learned in Section 1 to help designing possible solutions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we investigated using redundant resources to improve
browser security and mobile app testing. We first presented Cocktail, a
browser designed to improve security and reliability of modern web browsers.
We also presented CrowdBlaze, a platform combining interactive human test-
ing with automatic testing and static analysis to improve mobile app testing.
Cocktail used three off-the-shelf browsers in parallel to provide an oppor-
tunistic N-Version programming system. Cocktail mirrors all inputs across
the different browser replicas and votes on all outputs to withstand attacks,
even if one of the replicas becomes compromised or crashes. To enable voting,
Cocktail abstracts key security relevant states from each of our replicas and
compares these states across all replicas to withstand potential attacks. By
abstracting states, Cocktail focuses on security features of the system despite
the implementation-specific idiosyncrasies of each of our replicas. Our results
showed that Cocktail withstood four exploits on real browser vulnerabilities,
kept running after real browser crash issues and fault inject experiments,
and added little overhead to the page load latency times for the web sites we
tested.
In designing CrowdBlaze, we introduced the model construction and cov-
erage problem (mccp), which is to construct a model of an application and
cover bounded paths in the model with executions. We presented Statically
Aided Interactive Dynamic Analysis (sa¨ıda), a new technique to solve mccp.
sa¨ıda combines the strengths of static, dynamic, and interactive analysis in
an iterative feedback loop that allows the results of each analysis to drive and
improve the results obtained by the other. CrowdBlaze implements sa¨ıda
by running a static analyzer, dynamic analyzer, and a crowd-sourced inter-
active analysis tool in parallel. In experiments to cover all activities in eight
popular Android applications, we found that the combination of three anal-
yses covers more activities than pairwise combination, or isolated execution
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of each analysis. We are not aware of existing techniques that obtain the
same coverage or discover the behavior revealed by our tools.
Overall, we show that redundant resources can be used to improve software
systems in security and testing aspects.
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